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governing government investigations that is most often associated with the Fourth 
Amendment. It explains search and seizure law as a way to increase the efficiency of 
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occur absent legal regulation. This perspective on search and seizure law is descriptively 
helpful, it provides a useful analytical language to describe the role of different Fourth 
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Amendment doctrines, and it facilitates fresh normative insights about recurring 
debates in Fourth Amendment law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Although economic analysis plays an important role in many areas of legal 
scholarship,1 the law of search and seizure remains a notable exception. Search 
and seizure law is the part of criminal procedure that addresses limits on 
government collection of evidence. It consists primarily, although not 
exclusively, of judicial interpretations of the Fourth Amendment.2 The 
scholarship in the field is vast but predominantly doctrinal,3 focusing heavily 
on lawyerly considerations such as doctrinal coherence and the correct way to 
apply legal principles.4 
Economic analysis has made few inroads into the dense doctrinalism of 
search and seizure law scholarship. Before his untimely death, William Stuntz 
used informal economic insights to critique various aspects of Fourth 
Amendment law.5 In recent years, a handful of scholars have used economic 
 
1 See, e.g., Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to The Situational 
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 133 (2003) 
(describing law and economics as “currently the dominant theoretical paradigm for creating and 
analyzing legal policy”); Anthony T. Kronman, Dean, Yale Law Sch., Remarks at the Second Driker 
Forum for Excellence in the Law (Sept. 29, 1994) (describing the law and economics movement as 
“the single most influential jurisprudential school in this country”), in 42 WAYNE L. REV. 115, 160 
(1995). In this Article, I use the term “economics” in the broad sense to mean “the science of rational 
choice in a world—our world—in which resources are limited in relation to human wants.” RICHARD 
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (7th ed. 2007). 
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The field also includes statutory analogs to the Fourth 
Amendment such as the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 
Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
3 The most influential work of scholarship in Fourth Amendment law remains Wayne LaFave’s 
six-volume treatise, WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT (4th ed. 2004). LaFave’s treatise has been cited by more than 7500 judicial opinions 
in the Westlaw Journals & Law Reviews (JLR) database as of July 2015. 
4 For a critique of how Fourth Amendment scholarship is obsessed with coherence, see Ronald 
J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of Theory: Local Versus General 
Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1149, 1161 (1998). Dozens if not hundreds of scholarly 
articles contend that the Supreme Court has misapplied the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test. 
See, e.g., 4 LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 2.7(c) (arguing that the Supreme Court misapplied the test in 
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), which declined to extend Fourth Amendment protection 
to bank records). 
5 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1265, 1274-76 (1999) (arguing that Fourth Amendment protection acts like a tax that induces a 
change in the allocation of investigative resources towards unprotected investigative techniques that are 
cheaper for law enforcement); William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth 
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approaches to analyze specific doctrines.6 But economic analysis remains 
fairly rare and generally isolated in search and seizure law scholarship.7 The 
zeitgeist is that economics has little to say about search and seizure law—and 
that whatever it says isn’t very useful. 
This Article presents a different view. It argues that economics provides 
a surprisingly helpful lens to understand and critique search and seizure law. 
This field of law can be understood as a way to maximize the benefits of 
criminal law while minimizing the costs of its enforcement. The criminal 
justice system exists to achieve policy goals such as deterrence, incapacitation, 
and retribution.8 But achieving those goals requires enforcement, and 
enforcement requires the collection of evidence to prove cases in court. 
Search and seizure law helps to lower the costs of enforcing the law by 
blocking investigatory steps that would impose high externalities unlikely to 
be accounted for by law enforcement.9 
At first blush, it may seem odd to think of search and seizure law as a way 
to limit costs. Search and seizure scholarship is mostly about the Fourth 
 
Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 556-62 (1992) (contending that Fourth Amendment law resembles 
a tort law negligence standard in that law enforcement can only inflict substantial harms when justified 
by a corresponding public need); William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 
2144-50 (2002) (contending that the cost–benefit implied by constitutional reasonableness should 
lead to the adoption of more crime-severity distinctions); William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth 
Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 900-03 (1991) [hereinafter Stuntz, Warrants] (arguing that 
one role of search warrants is to avoid the ex post difficulty of measuring the harms of searches). 
6 See, e.g., Dhammika Dharmapala & Thomas J. Miceli, Search, Seizure and (False?) Arrest: An 
Analysis of Fourth Amendment Remedies when Police Can Plant Evidence (arguing that the remedies of 
Fourth Amendment law can create or discourage incentives for the police to plant evidence), in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ECONOMIC MODELS OF LAW 208, 210 (Thomas J. Miceli & Matthew 
J. Baker eds., 2013); Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 585, 592-94 (2011) (discussing the deterrent impact of the exclusionary rule); Craig S. 
Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951 (2003) (applying Learned Hand’s 
economic negligence formula to Fourth Amendment law); Steven Penney, Reasonable Expectations of 
Privacy and Novel Search Technologies: An Economic Approach, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 477, 
479-81 (2007) (arguing that Fourth Amendment law furthers economic self-interest to avoid 
dispersal of potentially harmful information); Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 
1981 SUP. CT. REV. 49, 54-55 (applying economic deterrence theory to Fourth Amendment 
violations); Ric Simmons, Ending The Zero-Sum Game: How to Increase the Productivity of the Fourth 
Amendment, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 549, 552 (2013) (applying economic principles to Fourth 
Amendment law). 
7 It is telling that a recent review of the literature on economic approaches to criminal 
procedure law focuses almost exclusively on “adjudicatory” criminal procedure—the litigation of 
criminal cases—and particularly the plea bargaining process. See Keith N. Hylton, Economic Analysis 
of Criminal Procedure, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Francisco Parisi 
ed., forthcoming 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2477425 [http://perma.cc/ 
6MXV-YCBE]. 
8 See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 35-58 (1968) 
(discussing the justifications for the criminal justice system). 
9 See infra Section I.C. 
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Amendment, which is generally thought to protect privacy rather than 
encourage efficient government.10 The cases speak of rights, not costs.11 But 
the costs of investigations are only rarely pecuniary, and it can be helpful to 
understand invasions of rights as the forced imposition of nonpecuniary costs. 
To collect evidence, the police break down doors and ransack property in a 
search for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.12 They place suspects under 
surveillance, invading their privacy. They place suspects under arrest, 
infringing their freedom of movement.13 All of these investigatory techniques 
impose costs on society, not only on suspects but also on their families and 
the communities in which they live. The effect is something like a                
coal-burning plant that pumps pollution into the atmosphere. Police 
investigations impose societal costs in the form of civil liberties violated, 
property destroyed, and peace and stability disrupted. 
From this perspective, search and seizure law is a way to account for 
investigative externalities and impose a rough cost–benefit test. The police act as 
agents of the public, investigating cases on the public’s behalf. But for reasons of 
both political economy and sociology, the police are unlikely to account fully for 
the societal harms that their investigations can impose.14 Search and seizure law 
can constrain the police by aligning police action with the public interest. The 
law can prohibit police action when its societal costs are likely to exceed its 
public benefits. The result can channel law enforcement resources into               
welfare-enhancing investigative alternatives instead of the welfare-reducing 
investigations that would result absent legal regulation.15 
Developing an economic understanding of search and seizure law is useful 
in three related ways. First, it provides a functional account of existing 
doctrine. Search and seizure law is notoriously undertheorized; Fourth 
Amendment law in particular has been condemned as “a mess,”16 “an 
embarrassment,”17 and “a mass of contradictions.”18 Economics provides a useful 
perspective from which to understand the role that various doctrines might 
serve. Second, an economic perspective can provide a helpful shared language 
 
10 See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494-95 (2014) (recounting how the Fourth 
Amendment “was the founding generation’s response to the reviled ‘general warrants’ and ‘writs of 
assistance’ of the colonial era” that today protects “the privacies of life” from government intrusion 
(quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625-30 (1886)). 
11 See, e.g., id. 
12 See infra Section I.A. 
13 See infra Section I.B. 
14 See infra Section I.C. 
15 See infra Section I.D. 
16 Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 1149. 
17 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST 
PRINCIPLES 1 (1997). 
18 Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1468 (1985). 
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to discuss and critique existing doctrines. Search and seizure law often lacks a 
shared vocabulary, and widely used terms and concepts are themselves 
contested.19 Economics can provide a clearer language to express concepts and 
understand doctrines. Third, economic analysis provides a normative 
framework that can advance longstanding scholarly debates. A careful study of 
one such debate, whether Fourth Amendment law should recognize             
crime-severity distinctions,20 provides an example of how economic modeling 
can advance existing understandings. 
The economic approach advanced in this Article does not provide the only 
way to understand search and seizure law. History, text, precedent, and other 
normative theories of constitutional and statutory interpretation all retain 
their longstanding importance. Nonetheless, the economic understanding of 
search and seizure law has significant explanatory power. It can introduce a 
helpful shared language, and it can provide a useful set of normative tools. 
This Article contains four parts. Part I introduces an economic model of 
investigative criminal procedure law in general, and search and seizure law in 
particular. Part II shows how existing Fourth Amendment doctrine roughly 
fits the economic model articulated in Part I. Part III evaluates whether 
existing Fourth Amendment remedies fit the theory. Finally, Part IV 
considers the benefits of the economic approach, focusing on how it can 
generate fresh insights about existing academic debates. 
I. AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW 
This Section develops an economic model of criminal investigations and the 
role of search and seizure protection within it. The Section begins by exploring 
the negative externalities of criminal investigations, and then turns to the 
principal–agent problem raised by police enforcement. It then focuses on the 
functional role of search and seizure law, explaining how the law can enforce a 
rough cost–benefit standard that can lower the costs of criminal investigations. 
A. The Negative Externalities of Police Investigations 
Gary Becker’s celebrated article Crime and Punishment: An Economic 
Approach famously offered an economic approach to the enforcement of 
criminal laws.21 Becker noted that achieving the utilitarian benefits of criminal 
law requires enforcing the law. The mere existence of criminal laws has little 
 
19 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 
504-05 (2007) (describing the inconsistency in the Supreme Court’s treatment of the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test). 
20 See infra Section IV.C. 
21 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). 
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effect.22 To achieve the benefits of the law, the government must hire, train, and 
equip police officers to investigate and enforce the laws.23 Becker then 
considered the optimal level of law enforcement as a function of the overall 
marginal cost of enforcement and the marginal benefit of enforcement.24 
Despite its canonical status, Becker’s article contains a significant 
oversight. Becker assumed that the costs of law enforcement are limited to 
internal expenses shown in the law enforcement budget such as hiring, 
training, and equipping officers.25 Not so. The costs of criminal investigation 
also include externalities imposed by investigators on suspects and the public. 
Once hired and trained, officers must gather evidence to prove crimes beyond 
a reasonable doubt.26 They must conduct surveillance with the hope of 
observing criminal activity so they can testify about it in court. They must 
seize evidence and take it into police custody so they can show it to the jury 
to prove their cases. And they must arrest suspects and take them into custody 
so the suspects will appear at trial as defendants. 
When the police take these steps, they necessarily impose costs and harms 
on others. Surveillance invades privacy, disrupting a sense of peace and chilling 
legitimate activities.27 Some investigative steps are violent, destructive, and 
costly, such as breaking down a door and rifling through an apartment in a 
search for evidence.28 Arresting a suspect violates his autonomy and freedom, 
often depriving his family and children of stability and support.29 Even lesser 
steps such as stopping a suspect on the street can be a deeply humiliating 
experience, not only inconveniencing targets but also angering them and their 
family and friends for being targeted by law enforcement.30 An economic model 
of criminal law enforcement must account for these costs. 
 
22 See id. at 169-70. 
23 See id. at 174 & nn. 8-9. 
24 See id. at 207-09. 
25 See id. at 174-76. 
26 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[W]e explicitly hold that the Due Process 
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every 
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”). 
27 See, e.g., Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1962-64 
(2013) (summarizing the various harms that surveillance can trigger). 
28 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 668 (1961) (describing a search of the suspect’s home 
in which the government broke in to the defendant’s home, handcuffed her, and then “numerous 
officers ransack[ed] through every room and piece of furniture, while the appellant sat, a prisoner 
in her own bedroom”). 
29 See generally DONALD BRAMAN, DOING TIME ON THE OUTSIDE: INCARCERATION AND 
FAMILY LIFE IN URBAN AMERICA (2007). 
30 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968) (“Even a limited search of the outer clothing for 
weapons constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must 
surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience.”). 
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In the language of economics, investigations create negative externalities. 
The external costs of enforcement can be roughly analogized to the pollution 
emitted from a coal plant. A company owns a plant that emits pollution, 
imposing a cost borne by the public instead of the company. Because the 
company does not internalize the cost of the pollution, it has an incentive to 
burn more coal than is desirable. The company will continue to burn coal 
even when its societal costs exceed its benefits because the company will 
continue to profit from it. The law may then impose a tax on production to 
internalize the cost.31 
Similarly, the “pollution” of criminal investigations is not borne by the 
police. Instead, it is borne by the public that is subjected to searches, seizures, 
and surveillance. Much like the company would burn more coal if its costs 
did not include environmental harms, the police may likewise engage in more 
invasive investigative techniques than are desirable if they do not account for 
the external costs. 
B.  Criminal Investigations as a Principal–Agent Problem 
The modern approach to enforcing criminal laws is through investigations 
by police officers, detectives, and agents, who are government employees 
tasked with collecting evidence. The role of search and seizure law can be 
helpfully understood as a response to a principal–agent problem created by 
this arrangement.32 The public, acting through its elected officials, hires the 
police to investigate and solve crimes to achieve benefits such as deterrence, 
retribution, and incapacitation.33 Although identifying the public interest in 
police enforcement requires assessing the external costs of investigations, 
there are good reasons to suspect that the public’s agents will undervalue 
those costs.34 The divergence between the interests of the principal and those 
of its agent explains the role of search and seizure law. 
 
31 See, e.g., Richard P. Adelstein, The Moral Costs of Crime: Prices, Information, and Organization 
(explaining that economists have long hypothesized that the costs of air pollution from steel 
production could be internalized in the form of a tax on that steel plant), in THE COSTS OF CRIME 
233, 234-35 (Charles M. Gray ed., 1979). 
32  Cf. Richard H. McAdams, Bill Stuntz and the Principal-Agent Problem in American Criminal Law, 
in THE POLITICAL HEART OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 47 (Michael Klarman et al. eds., 2012). 
33 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective on the 
Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (2003) (listing retribution, 
deterrence, and incapacitation as primary purposes of criminal punishment); William J. Stuntz, The 
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 549-50 (2001) [hereinafter Stuntz, 
Pathological Politics] (explaining the criminal investigative power as a grant from the public’s elected 
representatives to the police to serve as agents on the public’s behalf). 
34 See infra notes 58–69 and accompanying text. 
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1. The Principal’s Interests 
Consider the cost and benefits of investigative steps from the 
perspective of the public. The net benefit of any particular investigative step 
can be described as P*V – Ci – Ce, where P represents the increase in 
probability that the crime will be solved and successfully prosecuted, V 
represents the net value of a successful prosecution resulting from 
deterrence and incapacitation, Ci represents the internal costs of the 
investigative step, and Ce represents its external costs.35 Considered 
together, P*V – Ci – Ce represents the net public benefit from the expected 
decrease in crime that results from any investigative step. The public’s 
interest is to maximize this figure over all of the investigative steps, N, that 
are feasible using the resources available to law enforcement. 
Let’s take a closer look at each of these variables. P represents the increase 
in probability that the evidence needed to prosecute the crime will be 
discovered as a result of the technique. Investigative methods vary widely in 
their effectiveness. A low P means that the method does not increase the chance 
of solving the case very much, while a high P means that the method is more 
likely to solve the crime.36 V represents the value of successfully prosecuting 
that particular case. It consists of the prosecution’s deterrent effect (the extent 
to which punishment for the crime will make real the threat of future 
punishment and discourage future crimes), plus its incapacitative effect (the 
extent to which punishment may inhibit the wrongdoer’s ability to commit 
future crimes), minus the cost of the punishment itself. In general, more serious 
crimes should be associated with a higher V.37 
Internal costs Ci include two relatively distinct groups of costs. First, 
some internal costs are those borne by the government as a whole, as seen 
from the perspective of the police chief or policymakers overseeing the 
budget. These costs include the government’s cost of training the police, 
equipping them with squad cars, and paying their salaries and benefits. 
Second, there are additional internal costs from the perspective of individual 
police officers. Such costs may include the time and effort an officer spends 
 
35 Cf. Lerner, supra note 6, at 1020 (applying Learned Hand’s negligence formula to Fourth 
Amendment searches, so that the social benefit of a search can be represented as “P x V > C, where P 
is the probability of a successful search, V is the social benefit or value associated with the prevention 
or detection of a particular crime, and C is the social cost (or privacy intrusion) resulting from a 
particular kind of search”); Simmons, supra note 6, at 556-57 (applying Lerner’s model). 
36 Imagine a person is committing tax fraud. Observing him in public is unlikely to provide 
particularly helpful evidence. On the other hand, seizing and analyzing his laptop computer is likely 
to be much more helpful. The former would have a low P and the latter a high P. 
37 The correlation is hardly exact. Whether a particular prosecution will have a substantial 
deterrent or incapacitative effect will always depend on the circumstances of the person prosecuted 
(whether they are likely to commit more crime absent prosecution, for example), how widely the 
punishment is reported, and the like. 
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investigating a case, or the emotional and possible physical harm he 
experiences from a threat to his safety in a dangerous investigation. 
The relationship between these two kinds of internal costs can vary 
considerably from case to case. If an officer is badly injured on the job, the 
injury will increase costs both to the individual officer employee and the 
government employer (through greater healthcare costs and disability 
benefits). In other cases, however, the two kinds of costs have an inverse 
relationship. Imagine the police department buys an expensive new 
surveillance tool that makes it more convenient and less time-consuming for 
officers to conduct a particular kind of surveillance. The new tool would raise 
the first kind of internal cost because the government would have to buy the 
expensive equipment but then decrease the second kind of internal cost by 
making the surveillance less time-consuming for officers. 
Finally, Ce represents the external costs of the investigative step. These 
costs include privacy harms and property losses that result from an 
investigation that is imposed on a suspect. They also include the loss of 
autonomy and freedom imposed directly on the subject of the investigation 
(who may be guilty or innocent) as well as his family or associates.38 Taking 
a more expansive view, such costs can include more diffuse burdens imposed 
on the community at large. For example, a police raid on a neighborhood 
might trigger feelings of insecurity or danger. Additionally, a strong police 
presence in a high-crime community can cause widespread feelings of 
resentment or fear.39 
2. The Utility Function of the Police as Agents 
Next consider the perspective of the police hired as agents of the public. 
The utility function of law enforcement is difficult to model with precision. 
The history of U.S. law enforcement includes a wide range of different 
kinds of police and agents, hired and trained in different ways, accountable 
to different superiors, in the context of very different law enforcement 
efforts.40 Generalizations about what motivates the police will vary 
 
38 See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text. 
39 See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 132 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Among some 
citizens, particularly minorities and those residing in high crime areas, there is also the possibility 
that the fleeing person is entirely innocent, but, with or without justification, believes that contact 
with the police can itself be dangerous, apart from any criminal activity associated with the officer’s 
sudden presence.”). 
40 See SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1950–1990, at 51 (1993) (noting “wide-ranging reforms in the education, 
training, and supervision of police officers” during the second half of the 20th century). Cf. Jacobi, 
supra note 6, at 602 (“There are tiers of agency in the principal-agent relationship between the police 
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considerably across different eras, across different government agencies, and 
across investigations of different kinds of crime.41 
My goal is more modest: merely identifying what kinds of costs and 
benefits are likely to be a more or less significant part of the utility function 
of most officers. Following this modest approach, a useful conclusion is that 
although officers will generally place significant value on internal costs Ci and 
public benefit P*V, there is a considerable risk that they will systematically 
undervalue external costs Ce. The risk of law enforcement undervaluing Ce 
explains the role of search and seizure law. 
a. Internal Costs, Ci 
First, officers will generally place a significant value on internal costs Ci. 
This point is obvious for internal costs borne directly by individual officers. 
For an individual officer, internal costs will include the officer’s own time, 
effort, and threats to his personal safety. The more time and effort a step 
takes, and the more it threatens the officer’s safety, the less an officer will wish 
to engage in it. Like everyone else, officers consider their self-interest. They 
will likely weigh such costs carefully. 
A similar point is likely true, although to a lesser extent, about internal 
costs imposed on the government as a whole as seen from the perspective 
of the police chief or other senior officials.42 Individual officers in the field 
may not themselves care if a particular investigative technique drains the 
police budget or proves otherwise costly to the department. However, 
individual officers will be influenced at least to some extent by the policies 
and priorities of their bosses.43 Police chiefs must staff cases, and they must 
distribute law enforcement resources within existing budgets.44 By 
influencing choices about where police resources will go, costs imposed on 
the government will influence how the police behave. 
 
and the State: the police are answerable to their superiors, who are answerable to chiefs of police, 
the mayor, and so on up the line.”). 
41 See generally WALKER, supra note 40; Jacobi, supra note 6 (highlighting different viewpoints on 
police motivation). 
42 Cf. Jacobi, supra note 6, at 603 (noting that the incentive structure for individual officers 
differs from the incentive structure for more senior officials). 
43 See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (Scheindlin, 
J.) (discussing how stop-and-frisk policies encouraged by New York City’s mayor and police chief 
influenced the practices of street officers). 
44 See id. at 685 (discussing fiscal restraints of possible remedies to combat police misconduct). 
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b. Public Benefit, P*V 
The police will also often place significant value on P*V.45 Officers will 
often value solving cases, and they will generally value solving bigger cases 
more than solving smaller ones. There are two explanations for this: one 
based in public choice theory and the other based in sociology. 
The explanation from public choice theory is that the elected politicians 
have strong incentives to pay close attention to the voices and interests of 
potential crime victims.46 Crime is a salient issue for many voters and campaign 
donors who disproportionately represent potential victims of crime rather than 
suspects.47 As a result, the efficacy of law enforcement matters deeply to many 
voters.48 Politicians often respond to that pressure by striving to be “tough on 
crime,” especially in response to more serious offenses.49 
The reality that police departments are created, staffed, and run by elected 
officials or those appointed by elected officials leads to political pressure on 
officers to solve crimes. Police departments may require officers to bring in a 
certain number of arrests in a given period.50 An officer who makes many 
arrests may also receive overtime pay for the subsequent court proceedings.51 
These incentives create utility to officers to solve crimes, and especially      
high-profile or more serious offenses.52 From that perspective, solving crimes 
is only a good thing. As Donald Dripps writes, “Public choice theory suggests 
that an overwhelming preponderance of political incentives favor unrestricted 
enforcement of the criminal law.”53 
The sociological explanation is that many officers value solving cases 
because it gives them personal satisfaction and accrues prestige and respect 
among their peers. Officers are “engaged in the often competitive enterprise 
 
45 Recall that P represents the increase in probability that an investigative step will solve a 
crime and allow its successful prosecution, while V represents the net value of a successful 
prosecution of that particular case resulting from deterrence and incapacitation. 
46 See Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; or, Why 
Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1080 (1993). 
47 See id. at 1089. 
48 See id. at 1089-92; see also Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 33, at 509. 
49 See Thomas M. Mengler, The Sad Refrain of Tough on Crime: Some Thoughts on Saving the 
Federal Judiciary from the Federalization of State Crime, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 503, 529-30 (1995). 
50 See PETER MOSKOS, COP IN THE HOOD 142 (2008) (“Ultimately patrol officers are judged 
by quantifiable ‘productivity stats.’”); id. at 141 (reporting the author’s experience, as a Baltimore 
police officer, that his superiors imposed a de facto quota on the number of arrests). 
51 See id. at 136-37. 
52 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 
289 (1983) (offering a similar understanding for prosecutors in the context of plea bargains). 
53 Dripps, supra note 46, at 1081; see also Michael Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution 
Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 925 (2000) (“The 
ordinary political forces that often result in moderation and compromise disappear when the issue 
is criminal law.”). 
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of ferreting out crime.”54 Taking down a major criminal can be a victory in 
that “competitive enterprise” that is valued by officers.55 Many officers see 
themselves as there to protect the public from the criminal element preying 
on innocent victims.56 Within that mindset, catching criminals is a win. The 
bigger the case, the bigger the win. Of course, not all officers will be so  
public-minded. Some will shirk their duties or have other agendas. But in 
general, making a major arrest will often be cause for personal satisfaction 
and respect among fellow officers.57 
c. External Costs, Ce 
The third and final piece of the puzzle is the role of external costs. There 
are good reasons to think that, absent legal regulation, the police will pay 
comparatively less attention to external costs. In a world with no search and 
seizure law, officers will care less than they should about the harms their 
investigations inflict on civil liberties. As with consideration of P*V, this is 
true for reasons of both public choice theory and sociology. 
The public choice argument for why police officers likely discount Ce is the 
flip side of why they value P*V. Those who typically bear the external costs of 
investigations—criminal suspects and those who live with or near them—tend 
to be relative outsiders to the political process.58 They are outnumbered 
considerably by those who see themselves as victims of crime.59 Criminal 
defendants are overwhelmingly young60 and disproportionately poor,61 and 
 
54 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (Jackson, J.). 
55 Id. 
56 The police officer’s job, reflected in the common oath, is often said to be “to protect and 
serve the public.” Johnson v. Retirement Bd. of Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 484 N.E.2d 
1250, 1252 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). 
57 See MOSKOS, supra note 50, at 156 (noting that “[f]elony arrests look like home runs.”). 
58 See Dripps, supra note 46, at 1089 (noting that potential victims of crime have “much greater 
political influence” than criminal suspects). 
59 The arrest rate in 2012 for the entire United States has been estimated to be 3888.2 arrests 
per 100,000 inhabitants. See FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2012–PERSONS ARRESTED 
(2013), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/persons-
arrested/persons-arrested [http://perma.cc/QXE5-AUXE]. Although in one sense that number is 
very high, it also suggests that most people are not likely to see themselves as potential criminal 
defendants. Even if no person is arrested more than once in a year, over 96% of people are not 
arrested in a given year. 
60 See generally FBI, AGE-SPECIFIC ARREST RATES AND RACE-SPECIFIC ARREST RATES 
FOR SELECTED OFFENSES, 1993–2001 (2003), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/additional-ucr-
publications/age_race_arrest93-01.pdf [http://perma.cc/P27Z-3G8F]. 
61 According to one study, about 75% of individuals in state prison had been represented by 
appointed counsel that is only available to those who cannot afford their own defense. STEVEN 
K. SMITH & CAROL J. DEFRANCES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: SELECTED FINDINGS, 
INDIGENT DEFENSE 2-3 (1996), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/id.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
MC6T-5TFQ]. 
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therefore are less likely than most to vote or donate to campaigns.62 In many 
states, previously convicted felons cannot vote at all.63 For these reasons, most 
elected officials have less incentive than they otherwise would to focus on the 
external costs typically borne by targets of investigations.64 The legislative 
process disproportionately represents the interests of those who are potential 
crime victims rather than those who are potential criminal suspects. “Tough 
on crime” politicians become relatively insensitive to the external costs of 
investigations. Those incentives are passed on from politicians to the police, 
resulting in less attention to external costs by officers than the public interest 
would otherwise demand.65 
The sociological explanation leads to the same result. Studies indicate that 
police officers often see the imposition of external costs on suspects as a public 
good instead of a social cost.66 Experienced officers develop confidence in 
their ability to quickly identify criminals.67 Studies suggest that at least some 
officers divide the public into three categories: criminals, troublemakers who 
do not deserve police respect, and the public at large.68 Because officers focus 
their investigations on the first two groups, and many have an instinctive faith 
in their ability to identify their members, officers may come to see the 
external costs of investigations as an informal punishment inflicted on those 
who deserve them rather than an unfortunate byproduct of gathering 
evidence. In some cases, violating a suspect’s privacy or security in the course 
of investigating crime might be seen as informal “street justice” that itself 
deters crime or punishes those who trouble or threaten the police.69 
Political economy and sociological explanations point to the conclusion 
that police will often discount the external costs of their investigations absent 
search and seizure law. Officers will often weigh P*V against Ci, but they will 
tend to pay less attention to external costs Ce. The officers’ relative 
 
62 Older citizens tend to vote at substantially higher rates than younger citizens. See THOM FILE 
& SARAH CRISSEY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF 
NOVEMBER 2008 at 4 (2010), http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/p20-562.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
7WAG-MK3E]. 
63 See Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the Debate pver Felon 
Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1156-57 (2004) (“Current laws disenfranchise approximately 3.9 
million voting-age citizens, of whom roughly 1.4 million have completed their sentences.”). 
64 See Dripps, supra note 46, at 1094 (arguing that “taking the side of the suspect . . . invites 
retaliation by voters fearful of crime”). 
65 See supra notes 61–63. 
66 See, e.g., John Van Maanen, The Asshole, in POLICING: A VIEW FROM THE STREET 224-25 
(Peter K. Manning & John Van Maanen eds., 1978). 
67 See id. at 226-27; JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW 
ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 41-43 (3d ed. 1994) 
68 See Van Maanen, supra note 66, at 223-24 (summarizing studies). See generally Barbara E. 
Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453 (2004). 
69 See Van Maanen, supra note 66, at 224 (summarizing studies). 
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inattention to external costs creates a divergence between the interests of the 
principal and its agent. 
C. The Economic Role of Search and Seizure Law 
The divergence between the interests of the public and the police as their 
agents explains the role of search and seizure protections. Absent legal 
restriction, the police will discount external costs and take steps that seem 
desirable to officers but are welfare-reducing to society as a whole. Legal 
limits on investigative steps can change the officer incentives. By banning 
investigative steps when external costs would be excessive, search and seizure 
law forces the police to consider external costs that they might otherwise 
downplay or ignore. 
The result is a rough cost–benefit rule. The law can prohibit steps when 
their likely societal costs would outweigh their likely societal benefits. This 
can channel law enforcement resources into welfare-enhancing investigative 
alternatives instead of the welfare-reducing investigations that would result 
absent legal regulation. Absent legal regulation, officers would have no 
incentive to try the welfare-enhancing alternatives. Search and seizure law 
can provide the incentives by banning welfare-reducing investigations. 
Consider the Fourth Amendment, the most prominent source of search 
and seizure restrictions. The Fourth Amendment’s basic mechanism is to 
condition certain investigative methods on a showing of specific factual 
predicates. Some investigative steps are not deemed searches or seizures, and 
are therefore outside Fourth Amendment regulation.70 But other steps are 
labeled searches or seizures and are regulated in a specific way: in general, 
searches and seizures are deemed reasonable, and thus allowed, when the 
government can establish specific facts showing an expected law enforcement 
benefit, low external costs, or some combination of the two.71 As will be 
developed in detail in Part II, the result is a body of law that selects 
investigative steps with high external costs in the usual case and subjects them 
to regulation, ideally allowing them only when the government can establish 
specific facts that either show low external costs in the circumstances or that 
the government has a countervailing expected benefit that justifies the 
imposition of external costs. 
So understood, Fourth Amendment law can serve a channeling function in 
response to high external costs. When external costs are low, the law gives the 
police discretion to take those investigative steps subject to constraints of internal 
 
70 See infra Part III. 
71 See infra Part IV. 
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cost (set by law enforcement budgets) and perceived effectiveness.72 When 
external costs are high, the law can prohibit such steps unless the police can make 
specific showings that the expected benefit outweighs the costs.73 The law does 
not require the police to select the most beneficial investigative option.74 But it 
can rule out investigative techniques that can be expected to inflict high external 
costs absent a specific showing of expected benefit. The law pushes investigative 
resources into welfare-enhancing alternatives. 
D. A Fourth Amendment Example 
A hypothetical is useful to show the potential welfare-enhancing role of 
search and seizure law. Imagine a necklace has been stolen from a jewelry 
store in a town with only ten houses. And assume the police know the necklace 
is in one of the ten houses. A search of the house with the necklace will reveal 
the necklace, identify the thief, and lead quickly to his guilty plea. Assume 
that society benefits thirty utils in the future from deterrence and 
incapacitation if the crime is solved and the thief is locked away. Further 
assume that forcibly breaking into any home and searching it will cost a total 
of five utils, which will consist of one util in internal police costs and four 
utils of external costs imposed on the community. The police have no reason 
to think the necklace is more likely to be in any one house than any other. 
Consider what searches are in the public interest. If the only option is to 
forcibly search homes, the public interest is best served by no searches at all. 
Any search hurts the public interest because its expected cost will exceed its 
expected benefit. The cost is five utils, while the expected benefit is only three 
utils (a 10% chance of the necklace being in any one home multiplied by the 
thirty utils of benefit conferred by finding the necklace). The benefit to 
society (three) is smaller than the cost (five). The officers should not search. 
The officers may not see it that way, however. Assume that the police 
ignore the external costs of their searches. In their calculation, the expected 
benefit of searching a home is still three utils. But because the officers are 
ignoring external costs, the cost of a search is only one util instead of five 
utils. Now searching always seems desirable: three is greater than one, so a 
search looks like a win every time. Note the difference between the public 
interest and the police perspective if the police ignore external costs. The 
officers will want to search every home until the necklace is found because 
the benefits outweigh the internal costs. 
 
72 See infra notes 74–76. 
73 See infra notes 74–76. 
74 The Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to interpret Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness so as to require that the government pursue the least intrusive means of 
proceeding. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 629 n.9 (1989) (citing cases). 
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The picture changes, however, when we add consideration of Fourth 
Amendment law. The Fourth Amendment prohibits searching a home except 
under specific circumstances.75 Two circumstances are particularly important. 
First, the police can search a home if they obtain the voluntarily consent of 
someone who lives or stays there.76 As a result, the police can approach a 
particular home, knock on the door, and ask the homeowner for permission to 
search it.77 If the person allows the search, the search is constitutional. Second, 
officers can search a home if they obtain a valid search warrant, which requires 
the police to establish probable cause that the evidence will be in the home and 
requires them to search only the home where the evidence is likely to be.78 
Under this option, they must first investigate the case and find reasons to 
believe that the necklace is in a particular home. If they can collect sufficient 
evidence, they can then go to a judge, obtain approval, and search the home. 
These two investigative alternatives can change the public interest in a 
search. Consent searches have lower external costs because they occur with 
the homeowner’s permission and without breaking down doors or otherwise 
shocking the homeowner. Let’s say that if the officers ask for consent and the 
homeowner agrees and a search follows, the external cost of the search drops 
from the four utils without consent to only one util with it. Let’s also assume 
that if the officers ask for consent there is a 50% chance that the homeowner 
will decline. If the homeowner declines, asking for consent has a very low 
internal cost of (say) one-tenth of a util. 
Under this assumption, the option of lawful consent searches creates a net 
public gain. If the homeowner consents to a search, the consent search is a net 
gain because the three utils of benefit come at a cost of only two utils (one 
internal and one external). If the homeowner declines, the only loss was the 
one-tenth util of police internal cost from asking. Because the societal gain from 
the consenting homeowner is much greater than the equally likely loss from the 
objecting homeowner, asking for consent enhances public welfare. 
Trying to obtain a search warrant can be similarly beneficial. Investigating 
the crime to try to develop the needed probable cause can direct the police to 
the house where the necklace is likely to be. If the police can get a warrant, the 
search will have a high expected benefit because there is a good chance the 
necklace is there. Let’s add in some plausible numbers. Let’s say that if police 
investigate the crime and seek probable cause that the necklace is in a particular 
house, the investigation will cost five utils of internal cost of the officers’ time 
 
75 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (“It is a basic principal of Fourth Amendment 
law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”). 
76 See Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1137 (2014) (“A warrantless consent search is 
reasonable and thus consistent with the Fourth Amendment . . . .”). 
77 Id. at 1131-35. 
78 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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instead of the one util it costs to simply enter and search. Further, assume a 
50% chance the officers can develop probable cause. If the police can establish 
probable cause, assume a two-thirds likelihood that the necklace will be found 
there when the house is searched pursuant to a warrant. 
Under these assumptions, the option of investigating and obtaining lawful 
warrants also creates a net public gain. The expected payoff of an 
investigation is ten utils: a 50% chance of getting probable cause, which will 
enable a two-thirds chance of gaining thirty utils of public benefit. On the 
other hand, the expected cost is only 7.5 utils: five utils for the investigation, 
plus a 50% chance probable cause will be established and a five util cost search 
(four external utils and one internal util) will follow. 
Of course, this example is highly stylized. But notice how the Fourth 
Amendment can channel investigators into welfare-enhancing investigative 
methods. The Fourth Amendment blocks the welfare-reducing investigative 
method (raiding each house without cause) in favor of methods that have 
either lower external costs (asking for consent) or higher expected benefit 
(investigating to try to get probable cause). The law blocks the harmful option 
and channels the police into paths that represent net societal gains.79 
And here’s the key: absent legal restriction, the police would have no 
incentive to take these steps. In a world without the Fourth Amendment, 
trying to develop probable cause would seem like a waste of effort and time. 
From an officer’s perspective, searching a house costs only one util. Without 
Fourth Amendment law, officers would not want to spend five utils of their 
time and energy in an initial investigation just to have a 50% chance that they 
would have a two-thirds probability of finding the necklace. Similarly, from 
their perspective, asking for consent provides no benefit: it only adds cost. 
Search and seizure law can push officers to take steps in the public interest by 
imposing restrictions that account for external costs. 
E. Difficulties of Measurement and the Need for Categorical Rules 
The above example might suggest, at first blush, that an economic model of 
search and seizure law would be simple to apply. In an ideal world, we could 
tabulate costs and benefits of each step. The law could require the police to adopt 
the most welfare-enhancing strategy—or, at the very least, to choose among those 
that are welfare-enhancing—on a case-by-case basis. Imagine a hypothetical 
world in which the police carried around a sophisticated Externality-O-Meter that 
would exactly measure the externalities of every planned law enforcement step 
 
79 The police can also mix these strategies. They can try an investigation first, and if it fails try 
to obtain consent. Alternatively, they can begin an investigation and uncover at least some 
information pointing to a specific house and then try a consent search at that house. 
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and require the police to pay the costs of that step before taking it. Use of the 
Externality-O-Meter would internalize the costs of investigative steps, allowing 
the police to make the most efficient use of resources. 
Unfortunately, matters are not so simple in the real world. The variables 
P*V and Ce for a particular law enforcement step in a particular investigation 
are difficult to measure ex post and exceedingly difficult to predict ex ante. 
As a result, search and seizure law relies heavily on categorical rules that 
reflect broad generalizations of costs and benefits over defined ranges of 
cases.80 The categorical nature of search and seizure rules is sufficiently 
characteristic that it is worth pausing to reflect on the need for such rules and 
the choices that result. 
First, measuring external costs is very difficult. Some kinds of external costs 
may be measured easily, such as the value of property destroyed when the police 
break down the door to search for evidence inside.81 But most external costs of 
investigations are case-specific and are very difficult to quantify. For example, if 
the police search a family home and arrest the father for dealing drugs, the 
external costs might include the invasion of the family’s privacy; the residents’ 
lost sense of security; the interruption of family life; and the violation of the 
father’s autonomy. An officer about to take an investigative step will be hard 
pressed to calculate its external cost accurately. 82 
The same is true with measuring P*V. The extent to which a particular 
investigative technique will actually increase the odds of proving a particular 
criminal case is difficult to know. In some cases, a search technique may be 
very effective; in other cases, the same technique will produce no evidence at 
all. The deterrent and incapacitative value of solving a particular case is also 
very difficult to measure. In general, we hope and expect criminal 
prosecutions to have such effects, as they are the forward-looking utilitarian 
justifications for punishment.83 But how much a particular investigative step 
will trigger such benefits is generally unknowable ex ante, and to what extent 
it achieved that goal is not readily measurable ex post. 
Compounding the difficulty is the astonishing scale of criminal 
investigations in the United States. At present, state and federal agencies 
 
80 See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001) (“[W]e have traditionally 
recognized that a responsible Fourth Amendment balance is not well served by standards requiring 
sensitive, case-by-case determinations of government need, lest every discretionary judgment in the 
field be converted into an occasion for constitutional review.”). 
81 The cost might simply be that of repairing the damaged door, or alternatively, purchasing 
and installing a new one. 
82 See Stuntz, Warrants, supra note 5, at 900-03. Even a simple case such as calculating loss from 
a specific privacy invasion is quite difficult. See, e.g., Bruce E. Boyden, Can a Computer Intercept Your 
Mail?, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 669, 713 (2012) (discussing the difficulties of calculating privacy harms 
under the Wiretap Act). 
83 See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 13-23 (3d ed. 2001). 
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employ about 870,000 police officers and agents.84 Law enforcement officers 
in the United States make about 13 million arrests a year,85 and arrests cannot 
lawfully occur unless the officer has probable cause to think that a crime was 
committed and the officer has developed probable cause to think that the 
individual arrested committed it.86 As a result, the number of individual law 
enforcement investigative steps actually or potentially subject to Fourth 
Amendment regulation is likely orders of magnitude higher. 
Given the frequency of searches and seizures, and the difficulty in 
measuring the relevant variables to determine the cost-benefit of each, it is 
not surprising that Fourth Amendment doctrine is based heavily on 
categorical rules.87 The Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable 
searches and seizures can be divided into three questions: First, what is a 
search or seizure, and therefore subject to regulation? Second, when is a 
search or seizure reasonable, and therefore allowed? And third, what is the 
remedy for an unreasonable search or seizure?88 With respect to each 
question, the doctrine is based heavily on categorical rules.89 There are 
categorical rules governing the kinds of investigative steps that count as 
“searches” or “seizures,” when searches or seizures are reasonable and 
therefore permitted, and what remedies can be imposed for violations.90 
The categorical nature of most Fourth Amendment rules requires courts 
to choose how or whether to regulate investigative steps in ways that will have 
broad distributive effects. To see this, imagine a court must decide between 
regulating a particular investigative step by using either a permissive rule, 
which allows the police to take the investigative step with little or no legal 
regulation, or a restrictive rule, which allows the police to take the 
investigative step only under specific conditions such as a search warrant. 
 
84 See Orin Kerr, Fourth Amendment Remedies and Development of the Law: A Comment on 
Camreta v. Greene and Davis v. United States, 2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 237, 256 [hereinafter Kerr, 
Fourth Amendment Remedies] (collecting the figures). 
85 See HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ARRESTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1990-
2010 (2012), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/aus9010.pdf [http://perma.cc/7DU8-MDSF]. 
86 See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1976) (holding that probable cause to 
believe suspect committed a felony offense allows an arrest). 
87 See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 577 (1992) 
(“[T]he greater the frequency with which a legal command will apply, the more desirable rules tend 
to be relative to standards.”). 
88 See infra Parts II-III. 
89 See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (“[T]he protection of the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments ‘can only be realized if the police are acting under a set of rules which, in 
most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as to whether an 
invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement.’” (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, 
“Case-by-Case Adjudication” Versus “Standardized Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. 
REV. 127, 142)), abrogated on other grounds by Arizona v. Grant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).  
90 See infra Part III. 
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Under the permissive rule, the police will engage in the step in a set of cases 
that we can call Np. Under the restrictive rule, the police will engage in the 
step in a smaller set of cases we can denote Nr. 
In choosing between two legal rules, a court could compare the sum of 
P*V – Ci – Ce over the steps Nr (under the restrictive rule) to that sum over 
steps Np (under the permissive rule). If the step triggers high externalities 
and would be used often under the permissive rules, the sum of the public 
benefit over Nr would likely be greater than the sum over Np. In such a case, 
the restrictive rule would be preferable to the permissive rule, as it lowers the 
costs of enforcing the law by avoiding the high externalities under the 
permissive rule. On the other hand, if the step triggers only low externalities 
and would be used only rarely under the restrictive rule, then the permissive 
rule is likely preferable to the restrictive rule because the net benefit over Np 
likely exceeds that over Nr. 
Importantly, courts can and often do reach this result intuitively. To 
decide between a permissive rule and a restrictive rule, a court might consider 
whether the permissive rule will lead (or has led) to widespread civil liberties 
abuses. Roughly speaking, abuses will signal cases with low P*V, serious 
abuses will mean a low P*V matched with a high Ce, and widespread abuses 
will mean a high Np. If the restrictive rule will put an end to serious, 
widespread abuses, the P*V – Ci – Ce over the steps Nr will likely be greater 
than P*V – Ci – Ce over steps Np. 
For an example of this intuitive reasoning, consider the Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. United States District Court, where the Court 
considered whether a search warrant is required for domestic security 
wiretapping.91 In choosing between the restrictive rule of a warrant and the 
permissive rule of no warrant, the Supreme Court compared the risk and 
seriousness of abuses, as well as the impact on legitimate government 
investigations, under both rules.92 The Court concluded that a warrant was 
required because it would not substantially interfere with legitimate 
investigations but would significantly limit the serious risks of widespread 
government abuses.93 Although expressed informally, the Court’s analysis 
rests on a comparison of P*V – Ci – Ce over steps Np and Nr. 
 
91 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
92 Id. at 314-21. 
93 Id. at 321. 
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II. AN ECONOMIC UNDERSTANDING OF FOURTH              
AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
This Part considers whether existing doctrine fits the theory. Focusing on 
the Fourth Amendment as the leading example of search and seizure law, it 
concludes that the contours of existing Fourth Amendment doctrine appear 
to fit the economic model relatively well. It can’t be shown whether existing 
doctrine actually achieves the goals of the model. That would require 
empirical studies far beyond the scope of this Article and perhaps impossible 
to measure accurately.94 Instead, this Part makes a more modest claim: the 
basic contours and features of existing Fourth Amendment doctrine fit what 
the model would predict about search and seizure law. 
Fourth Amendment law fits the model with its two basic steps. First, 
Fourth Amendment law identifies police investigative techniques that in 
general will have high externalities. Next, the law conditions use of those 
techniques on a showing of specific facts that will tend to involve low external 
costs in context, a countervailing public benefit, or both. Fourth Amendment 
case law takes on these two steps using the textual prohibition of unreasonable 
searches and seizures, which divides the inquiry into the threshold question 
of what is a search or seizure (and thus regulated by the Fourth Amendment) 
and the subsequent question of reasonableness. 
Identifying searches and seizures roughly draws the line between 
techniques with low external costs that should not require legal regulation 
and techniques with high external costs that should.95 The reasonableness 
inquiry requires the government to justify the use of techniques that generally 
have high external costs with specific facts either showing that the imposition 
of costs is justified by a likely public benefit or that those costs are low in 
context. 96 The warrant requirement requires the government to show a 
likelihood of public benefit to justify a search,97 while other exceptions, such 
as consent, require a showing that a technique is being used in a way that 
external costs are likely to be low.98 The result is a rough cost–benefit inquiry 
that restricts the use of certain techniques unless the public benefit is likely 
to outweigh the external costs. 
 
94 As desirable as such empirical evidence would be, the field of criminal procedure has long 
developed without it. See generally Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent 
Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 733, 735 (2000) (criticizing the lack of empirical and scientific analysis in constitutional 
criminal procedure decisions). 
95 See infra Section II.A. 
96 See infra Section II.C. 
97 See infra subsection II.C.1. 
98 See infra subsection II.C.2. 
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The analysis proceeds in three parts. The first part shows how the scope 
of searches and seizures plausibly distinguishes steps with low externalities 
from steps with high externalities. The second part considers the recurring 
question of technological change and the dynamic I have elsewhere called 
“equilibrium-adjustment.”99 The third part explains the function of the warrant 
requirement and exceptions to the warrant requirement. 
A. Searches and Seizures 
Supreme Court case law on searches and seizures is notoriously complicated, 
but it can be understood largely by reference to external costs Ce. The test for 
searches roughly identifies the point that government action likely will trigger 
significant external costs relating to invasions of privacy. Similarly, the test for 
seizures roughly identifies the point that government action likely will trigger 
significant external costs relating to control of property. 
1. Searches 
There are two ways of understanding Fourth Amendment search 
doctrine: what I have called the “principles layer” and the “application 
layer.”100 The principles layer of doctrine announces the general standards and 
terms of art to be used in applying Fourth Amendment law.101 The application 
layer of doctrine applies those principles to identify the specific rules that 
govern a specific subset of cases.102 The distinction is important because there 
is a wide gap between the conceptual uncertainty of the principles layer and 
the relatively clear rules at the application layer.103 
At the principles layer, the Supreme Court has stated that a search occurs 
when government conduct violates a “reasonable expectation of privacy” or 
constitutes a physical trespass.104 The “reasonable expectation of privacy” test is 
difficult to understand because it is a contested term of art rather than a literal 
test. As I have detailed elsewhere, the Court has given this phrase different 
meanings in different contexts, and it has not attempted to reconcile those 
different approaches.105 Given these complexities and the highly contested nature 
 
99 Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 
476, 480 (2011) [hereinafter Kerr, Equilibrium-Adjustment]. 
100 See id. at 490-92 (articulating the distinction between the two types of Fourth Amendment 
doctrine). 
101 See id. at 490. 
102 See id. at 491. 
103 See Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 1153-61 (noting the clarity of Fourth Amendment 
rules and its contrast with the ambiguity of Fourth Amendment theory). 
104 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950-52 (2012). 
105 Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 504-05 (2007). 
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of principles layer doctrine, the more helpful way to understand Fourth 
Amendment search doctrine is to focus on the application layer. 
At the application layer, the rules for what is a Fourth Amendment search 
tend to be fairly clear. Examples of searches include physically breaking into 
a person’s home;106 rifling through a person’s pockets;107 entering a suspect’s 
car;108 and opening up a person’s packages or postal letters.109 On the other 
hand, conduct that does not count as a search includes observing a person in 
public,110 entering open fields not near a home,111 accessing a person’s garbage 
left at the side of the road for pickup,112 aerial observation from public 
airspace,113 and obtaining information that has been voluntarily disclosed to 
third parties.114 The main theme among these results is the difference between 
inside surveillance and outside surveillance. For the most part, the doctrine 
can be explained by a simple principle: breaking into a private space is a 
search, while observing from outside is not.115 
So understood, Fourth Amendment search doctrine plausibly identifies 
the point that government action will tend to trigger significant external costs 
relating to invasions of privacy. Different people may disagree on what 
specific kinds of conduct invade privacy. But existing doctrine likely matches 
fairly shared intuitions. The “prototypical”116 search, entry into a home, is 
particularly invasive because “every man’s house is his castle,”117 where 
“intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man’s home and the 
 
106 See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (“At the very core [of the Fourth 
Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from 
unreasonable governmental intrusion.”). 
107 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (“[I]t is nothing less than sheer torture of the English 
language to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person’s clothing all over his 
or her body in an attempt to find weapons is not a ‘search.’”). 
108 See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-22 (1982). 
109 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877). 
110 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[C]onversations 
in the open would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the 
circumstances would be unreasonable.”). 
111 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 184 (1984). 
112 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988). 
113 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986). 
114 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976). 
115 See Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. 
L. REV. 1005, 1010 (2009). Cases at the margins often involve line drawing between inside and outside 
surveillance. See id. at 1035-37. For example, directing a thermal-imaging device at a private home from 
public space to learn the details of what is inside the home is a search, at least so long as the device is 
not in general public use, because it is a virtual entry in the home; on the other hand, using a drug-
sniffing dog to walk around a car and smell for narcotics inside is not a search because it does not reveal 
the same private information that physical entry would reveal. See id. at 1035-36 (discussing the majority 
and dissenting opinions in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001)). 
116 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. 
117 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 50 (1963) (quoting Barnard v. Bartlett, 64 Mass. 501, 502-03 (1852)). 
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privacies of life”118 occurs, making the home “the center of the private lives 
of our people.”119 Patting down a person’s outer garments is a search because 
it is “a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict 
great indignity and arouse strong resentment.”120 People tend to store their 
most secret items away in private spaces such as their homes and their 
pockets, the thinking runs, so that exposure of the contents of those private 
spaces carries with it a great sense of violation and loss. 
In contrast, the cases suggest that observation from the outside—the 
conduct that is not deemed a search—tends to trigger lower external costs. 
Public spaces “do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the 
Fourth Amendment is intended to shelter from governmental interference or 
surveillance.”121 When we go outside, we know that we can be observed by 
others just as we observe others ourselves. We routinely adjust our conduct 
accordingly, taking steps to hide what is revealed and making observation less 
invasive. The government can surely learn something about a person using 
public surveillance. Watching a person in public can reveal their sex, height, 
weight, race, mannerisms, and plans for the day. But learning such widely 
known information is not generally associated with the kind of embarrassment 
or harm that comes from the exposure of hidden information in enclosed spaces 
such as our homes, our letters, or our pockets. 
Again, opinions can vary person-to-person or community-to-community 
on exactly what constitutes a significant privacy invasion. In general, though, 
the Supreme Court’s cases defining Fourth Amendment searches likely track 
widely shared intuitions of external costs.122 
2. Seizures 
The next threshold question, the test for a Fourth Amendment seizure, is 
whether the government meaningfully interferes with an individual’s 
possessory interest.123 The classic case is governmental taking control of a 
 
118 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984). 
119 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 99 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
120 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968). 
121 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179. 
122 In some cases, the need for categorical bright line rules leads to underinclusive or 
overinclusive results in specific cases. An intriguing example is Arizona v. Hicks, in which an officer 
inside a suspect’s apartment suspected that an expensive turntable he saw might be stolen. 480 U.S. 
321 (1987). The officer picked up the turntable to read the serial number in order to check whether 
it was stolen. Id. at 323. The Court divided six to three on whether this was a search. Id. at 333. To 
six Justices, per Justice Scalia, moving the turntable was a search because it exposed private 
information, and the very minor intrusion on privacy under the specific facts of that case did not 
alter that conclusion. Id. at 323-29. To three Justices in dissent, the officer’s act was such a minor 
invasion that it should not have been deemed a search. Id. at 333-39.  
123 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 
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suspect’s property and bringing it into police custody. Seizures also occur when 
the government permanently damages property,124 although minor or only 
temporary damage is not a seizure.125 Further, government agents seize a person 
(as compared to property) when they “restrain[] the freedom of a person to 
walk away.”126 The basic test is whether the government acquires control: the 
government “seizes” an item for Fourth Amendment purposes when it wrests 
control of it away from its prior possessor. 
The seizure test also relates closely to Ce. It identifies the point at which 
government action triggers significant externalities involving property control. 
Investigative steps cause significant harm when they destroy property, deny 
people access to their property, or limit a person’s freedom of movement. The 
test for Fourth Amendment seizures draws that line directly. When the 
government destroys property, takes it away, or limits a person’s freedom, the 
government action will tend to have a high Ce and will constitute a Fourth 
Amendment seizure subject to regulation. When government action falls short 
of those consequences, the government action will tend to have a lower Ce and 
will not count as a seizure. The seizure definition generally distinguishes minor 
inconveniences from more significant deprivations of property or freedom—
that is, low Ce from high Ce. 
B.  Equilibrium-Adjustment and the Problem of Technological Change 
Focusing on Ce to understand what constitutes a search or seizure also 
helps explain how Fourth Amendment doctrine responds to technological 
change. The Supreme Court changes Fourth Amendment doctrine over 
time in a predictable way that I call “equilibrium-adjustment.”127 As 
technological change expands or narrows government power under 
preexisting Fourth Amendment rules, the Court changes the rules to try to 
maintain the prior equilibrium of government investigative power.128 If 
technological change expands government power under the old rules, the 
Court adds legal protections; if technological change restricts government 
power, the Court cuts back on legal protections.129 
Equilibrium-adjustment can be understood as an application of the 
economic approach to the specific problem of technological change. 
Technological change alters the prior relationship among Ce, Ci, and P*V over 
 
124 Bonds v. Cox, 20 F.3d 697, 702 (6th Cir. 1994). 
125 Porter v. Jewell, 453 F. App’x 934, 937 (11th Cir. 2012). 
126 Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 595 (1989) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner,                     
471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985)). 
127 Kerr, Equilibrium-Adjustment, supra note 99, at 478. 
128 See id. at 479-80. 
129 See id. at 480. 
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the set N of uses. When the Court engages in equilibrium-adjustment, it 
changes from permissive rules to restrictive rules, or from restrictive rules to 
permissive rules, in ways that move toward restoring the prior relationship 
among these variables. This allows Fourth Amendment doctrine to maintain 
its rough cost–benefit approach when technology alters the costs and benefits 
of different investigative steps. 
Two recent examples help demonstrate the dynamic: GPS monitoring in 
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in United States v. Jones,130 and applying the 
search-incident-to-arrest exception to cell phones in Riley v. California.131 In 
his concurring opinion in Jones, on behalf of four Justices, Justice Alito 
concluded that long-term monitoring of a GPS device installed in a car 
constituted a Fourth Amendment search.132 In a 1983 case, the Court had held 
that monitoring a primitive radio beeper inside a car to determine its location 
on public roads is not a search because a person has no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in public.133 In contrast to radio beepers, the GPS devices at issue 
in Jones are cheap, easy to use, and generate tremendous amounts of data. 
According to Justice Alito, that technological change made a difference. 
Technology had made pervasive monitoring that was previously “difficult and 
costly and therefore rarely undertaken”134 instead now “relatively easy and 
cheap.”135 This led to a threat of more invasive monitoring than before, 
justifying Fourth Amendment regulation of long-term GPS surveillance.136 
Justice Alito’s equilibrium-adjustment is easily understood in economic 
terms.137 Technological advances had lowered internal costs Ci at the same 
time that it had raised Ce. As Ci dropped, use of the technique became more 
widespread, expanding the set Np, thus including more uses at greater Ce in 
contexts with low P. Put another way, as the technology became cheaper and 
more invasive, the police could use it more often, including when there was 
little or no law enforcement need for it. Technology lowered internal costs, 
creating dangers of abuse under the permissive rule. Justice Alito adopted the 
restrictive rule to help ensure that the government would use this high-Ce 
authority only when justified by a significant P. 
 
130 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
131 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
132 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
133 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983). 
134 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring). 
135 Id. at 964. 
136 Justice Alito did not state at precisely what point that line was crossed, although he 
concluded that twenty-eight days was too long. See id. at 964. 
137 See Kevin S. Bankston & Ashkan Soltani, Tiny Constables and the Cost of Surveillance: Making 
Cents Out of United States v. Jones, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 335, 335 (2014) (providing a “cost-based 
conception of the expectation of privacy”). 
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The recent majority opinion in Riley v. California reveals a similar 
dynamic. 138 In 1973, the Supreme Court had announced a bright-line rule that 
all property on a person at the time of arrest can be searched incident to arrest 
without a warrant.139 In Riley, the Court held that a different rule applied to 
searching cell phones possessed at the time of arrest. The Court’s opinion 
relied in large part on the differences between physical and digital searches. 
A search of physical evidence on the person were necessarily narrow, the 
Court noted, as a person could only store so much physical evidence in his 
pocket. Modern smart phones raised a different dynamic, as they can store an 
extraordinary amount of deeply personal information.140 The ability to store 
so much personal information made the search of a cell phone much more 
invasive and therefore justified a warrant.141 
The Court’s equilibrium-adjustment in Riley is again readily explained in 
economic terms. In 1973, a search incident to arrest triggered low Ce. The 
introduction of modern cell phones greatly increased the invasiveness of such 
searches, raising Ce. The Court adjusted to a restrictive rule for such searches 
in light of that change, requiring the government to prove an expected benefit 
before imposing the greater external cost. 
C.  Constitutional Reasonableness: The Warrant Requirement and Its Exceptions 
When the government conducts a search or seizure, the Fourth Amendment 
requires that it must be “reasonable.” The Supreme Court has explained that 
reasonableness usually requires a search warrant or an exception to the warrant 
requirement.142 We can therefore review the doctrines related to reasonableness 
by starting with the warrant requirement and then reviewing its exceptions. 
Broadly speaking, the doctrine seems to reflect a general principle that searches 
and seizures are reasonable when the government can establish specific facts 
either showing an expected law enforcement benefit, low external costs in 
context, or some combination of the two. 
1. The Warrant Requirement 
The Fourth Amendment states that “no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”143 Probable 
 
138 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014). 
139 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). 
140 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489. 
141 See id. at 2493. 
142 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). 
143 U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
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cause requires proof of “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a 
crime will be found in a particular place.”144 The particularity requirement 
limits the scope of Fourth Amendment searches to a particular place and 
particular evidence. The particularity requirement limits the scope of Fourth 
Amendment searches to a particular place and particular evidence. The 
requirement forbids “general searches,” which are searches that do not limit 
where the police can search and for what.145 Under the particularity 
requirement, the government can typically search only one home at a time, 
and the warrant must name the evidence sought to the degree practicable.146 
The requirements of probable cause and particularity limit invasive 
searches to circumstances that are likely to advance investigations and that 
will have limited external costs. Probable cause suggests a relatively high P; 
particularity requires a relatively low Ce. The warrant requirement allows 
searches and seizures when the imposition of Ce is offset by a significant P 
and the use of mechanisms to lower Ce. 
The probable cause requirement serves three roles. First, it requires the 
government to show a likely benefit that justifies its cost. The government must 
establish a significant likelihood that the search will be a success and that evidence 
of the crime will be recovered in the place searched. This will tend to correlate 
with a high P: the more likely it is that evidence will be found, the more likely 
the search will assist in solving the case. A “fair probability”147 that evidence will 
be found in the place to be searched establishes a significant likelihood that the 
search will advance the investigation. 
Second, the probable cause requirement channels police resources into low-
Ce evidence-gathering that can minimize the need for high-Ce searches. If the 
search doctrine accurately distinguishes low-externality techniques from         
high-externality techniques, the probable cause requirement will limit the 
number of high-externality searches by forcing the police to use low-externality 
steps to identify where evidence is likely to be located. If the police can solve 
cases using only low-externality methods, they will try that first. And if the police 
need warrants, they will try to gather evidence to justify those warrants using 
low-externality techniques. The necklace hypothetical discussed earlier in Part I 
hints at this dynamic. The warrant requirement forced the police to conduct a 
low-externality investigation to find out which house stored the necklace instead 
of simply raiding every house. 
 
144 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
145 See generally Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-86 (1965). 
146 See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 3.4(e) (discussing the particularly requirement as applied to 
multiple-occupancy buildings). 
147 Gates, 462 U.S at 238. 
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Probable cause can also limit Ce by increasing the chance that external costs 
will be borne by the guilty rather than the innocent. A search of a guilty person 
will generally impose smaller external costs than a search of someone who is 
innocent.148 An innocent person who is searched is likely to feel shocked and 
humiliated by the experience; a guilty person is more likely to feel unlucky that 
the police were able to catch him.149 Although a search warrant for evidence of 
crime can be used to search the home of an innocent third party,150 the more 
common case is for a warrant to be executed at the home of a suspect. The 
requirement of probable cause thus leads to more searches and seizures of the 
guilty, which will generally be associated with lower Ce. 
The particularity requirement also lowers Ce by ensuring that warrant 
searches are narrow in location and scope. The search must occur at a specific 
place, such as an individual home: a warrant cannot be obtained to search a 
city block or an entire neighborhood.151 A warrant allowing such a broad 
search would be a prohibited “general warrant” that would impose an 
extremely high Ce. Requiring that the warrant describe the item to be 
searched with particularity limits where the police can search (they can only 
search where the described evidence could be found), how much they can take 
away (they ordinarily can only seize evidence described in the warrant), and 
potentially how long the search can continue (as the search must end when 
the described evidence has been located).152 The particularity requirement 
thus limits Ce by limiting how much the government can search and how 
much property it can take away. 
2. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement 
Fourth Amendment doctrine also recognizes several exceptions to the 
warrant requirement. Established exceptions include consent, exigent 
circumstances, as well as the general reasonableness approach that the 
Supreme Court occasionally applies.153 In these circumstances, a search is 
reasonable—and therefore allowable—even if no warrant has been obtained. 
 
148 Posner, supra note 6, at 60; cf. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 384 (2007) (weighing costs and 
benefits associated with the police officer’s use of force and discounting the harms imposed on the 
culpable individual who created the risk and “produced the choice between two evils” of whether to 
use force to stop him or let him escape). 
149 See Posner, supra note 3, at 60 (arguing that one who commits crime is likely to be relatively 
insensitive to the affront of being investigated and caught). 
150 See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 554 (1978) (allowing a search warrant to be 
executed at a third-party premises). 
151 See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 6, § 4.5. 
152 See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 139-41 (1990). 
153 See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 572 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (listing exceptions 
to the warrant requirement). 
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Each of these exceptions can be explained as allowing investigative steps 
when external costs Ce are low, the expected benefit P*V is high, or some 
combination of the two. 
First, consent searches are reasonable when a person with common 
authority over the space to be searched voluntarily consents to a search of 
that space.154 The voluntariness standard is based on all of the circumstances 
that indicate whether the consent was voluntary or instead the product of 
duress or coercion.155 Consent doctrine is generally consistent with an 
economic perspective to the extent it allows searches when the expected Ce 
should be unusually low. When a person with authority over a space 
voluntarily consents to a search, the government will not need to surprise the 
targets by breaking down the door and rifling through property. The 
consenting person can open the door, so the door is not broken down; she can 
direct the police to the evidence, so the police do not need to rifle through 
the entire space. Further, those who consent to a search will not have the same 
sense of violation or humiliation that they would have if the police were to 
raid their spaces without permission. If the consent is truly voluntary—a 
significant assumption—the consenting individual is in charge and external 
costs should be comparatively low. 
The police can also conduct a warrantless search or seizure when justified by 
exigent circumstances. This exception applies when, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, “the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement 
so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.”156 This can occur in several different circumstances. In some cases, 
exigent circumstances allow searches when the trail would otherwise go cold: the 
entry may be necessary “to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence,”157 or 
when the officers are in “hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect.”158 In those 
circumstances, most courts require probable cause in addition to the 
emergency.159 Exigent circumstances searches may also be justified when the 
officers have a quick opportunity to prevent harms, such as when officers enter 
“to provide emergency assistance to an occupant of a home.”160 
In general, the exigent circumstances doctrine allows searches when the 
benefit P*V is unusually high. Consider Welsh v. Wisconsin.161 A suspected 
 
154 See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 8. 
155 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). 
156 Missouri v. McNeely 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013) (quoting Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 
1856 (2011)). 
157 Id. at 1559. 
158 Id. at 1558. 
159 See, e.g., United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 598 F.3d 997, 1004 (8th Cir. 2010). 
160 McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1558. 
161 466 U.S. 740 (1984). 
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drunk driver wandered into his home, and a police officer entered the home 
without a warrant to arrest the suspect in his bedroom. The Court ruled that 
the exigent circumstances doctrine did not allow the entry.162 On one hand, 
entry into a home was the “chief evil” that the Fourth Amendment protected 
against, suggesting that the costs Ce was high.163 On the other hand, the crime 
of drunk driving was only a very minor offense—under Wisconsin law at the 
time, it was only a noncriminal violation—indicating a very low interest of 
the state (and thus a low V).164 Given the significance of entering the home, 
forced entry to gain evidence of a crime that was of such minor significance 
to the state was not reasonable.165 
Fourth Amendment doctrine also permits the police to engage in several 
kinds of searches justified by officer safety. During a temporary stop, officers 
can frisk a suspect for weapons if there are specific and articulable facts that 
a suspect is armed and dangerous.166 After making an arrest, they can search 
neighboring areas that might harbor a co-conspirator.167 During a traffic stop, 
officers can order the driver and passengers out of the car.168 All of these steps 
involve relatively narrow searches and seizures justified as measures that 
protect officer safety and thereby lower internal costs Ci. If an officer cannot 
take steps to avoid danger, he increases the chances of incurring the severe 
costs of being seriously injured or even killed. If a search or seizure for officer 
protection is only minimally invasive—that is, it has low Ce—then allowing 
an officer to take such a modest step to avoid this severe potential cost will 
lower the overall cost of enforcing the law. 
Finally, the Supreme Court has also allowed some kinds of searches and 
seizures without a warrant based on a more general reasonableness balancing 
standard. The Court has applied this standard in specific contexts outside the 
traditional warrant doctrine and its exceptions, such as for excessive force 
claims169 and searches inside a person’s body for evidence.170 Under the general 
reasonableness standard, “Whether a search is reasonable is determined by 
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s 
 
162 Id. at 753-54. 
163 Id. at 748 (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)). 
164 See id. at 754 (reasoning that the state’s classification of drunk driving as a “noncriminal, 
civil forfeiture offense” indicates that the state’s interest was not particularly weighty). 
165 See id. at 753 (“[A]pplication of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a 
home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor 
offense, such as the kind at issue in this case, has been committed.”). 
166 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). 
167 Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 335 (1990). 
168 Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 (1997); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977). 
169 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). 
170 See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985) (weighing the “medical risks of the operation” and 
the “intrusion on the [suspect’s] privacy interests” against the public’s interest in prosecuting the suspect). 
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privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of 
legitimate governmental interests.”171 This standard “involves a balancing of all 
relevant factors”172 based on a totality of all of the circumstances: the court will 
“balance the privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns to determine 
if the intrusion was reasonable.”173 For a search to be deemed reasonable and 
therefore lawful, “[t]he government interest must outweigh the degree to which 
the search invades an individual’s legitimate expectations of privacy.”174 
The general reasonableness standard clearly fits the economic perspective. 
Here, the doctrine itself is a thinly disguised cost–benefit analysis. When a 
court “balances” the intrusion of a search with the degree it promotes 
legitimate government interests, the court is really asking whether the 
benefits of that promotion exceed its costs.175 Consider Maryland v. King,176 
which analyzed whether the Fourth Amendment permits the government to 
take a buccal swab of a suspect arrested for a serious crime and analyze the 
DNA for a match with samples in a government database.177 According to the 
majority, this investigative step greatly advanced the government’s interest in 
furthering its criminal cases178—that is, the method has a high P. With 
“unique effectiveness,”179 the procedure provided a “safe and accurate way to 
process and identify the persons and possessions they must take into 
custody,”180 needed to assess the arrestee’s dangerousness and flight risk. 
On the other hand, the swab in King imposed only “a minimal”181 
intrusion—that is, low Ce. It did not create a physical danger and involved 
“virtually no risk, trauma, or pain.”182 The swab was used only when a person 
had been arrested and therefore already had reduced freedom and privacy, and 
subsequent DNA analysis was only for identity purposes and was not known to 
reveal “any private medical information.”183 Because the DNA testing greatly 
furthered government interests and imposed only minimal physical or privacy 
 
171 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 
112, 118-19 (2001)). 
172 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817 (1996). 
173 Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001). 
174 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1977 (2013). 
175 See, e.g., Weigel v. Broad, 544 F.3d 1143, 1161-63 (10th Cir. 2008) (analyzing the 
reasonableness of a use of force and concluding that “[t]he cost-benefit analysis clearly tips in favor 
of the troopers even though it resulted in Weigel’s death”). 
176 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013). 
177 Id. at 1966-68. 
178 See id. at 1977 (reasoning that DNA testing has “unmatched potential . . . to serve” the 
government’s interest in identifying arrestees). 
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180 Id. at 1970. 
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harms, the former outweighed the latter and the search was reasonable at least 
for “serious offenses”184—that is, offenses with high V. As King suggests, the 
general reasonableness balancing under the Fourth Amendment is readily (even 
obviously) understood as a form of cost–benefit analysis. 
People will disagree about whether the Supreme Court gets it right. 
Opinions will differ about what kind of conduct triggers high externalities or 
what contexts are likely to trigger a countervailing government benefit. The 
Justices will often disagree, as well. Like many important Fourth Amendment 
precedents, King was 5-4.185 But in general, the categorical rules of Fourth 
Amendment law at least plausibly reflect common intuitions about what kinds 
of conduct are particularly invasive and what contexts render such conduct 
more helpful than harmful. 
III. AN ECONOMIC UNDERSTANDING OF FOURTH              
AMENDMENT REMEDIES 
When the Fourth Amendment has been violated, the next question is the 
appropriate remedy. Federal law creates three primary legal remedies for 
Fourth Amendment violations: the exclusionary rule, civil damages against 
officers, and criminal prosecution.186 This Part explores the remedies for 
Fourth Amendment violations and considers whether existing remedies 
doctrine fits the economic model. 
The Part makes two basic points. First, at least at the level of narrative, 
the Supreme Court’s current explanation of its existing remedies scheme 
appears consistent with the economic goal of achieving the most enforcement 
of the law at the lowest overall cost. The exclusionary rule is expressly 
governed by a cost–benefit inquiry. Suppression is allowed only if the 
deterrent benefits of suppression outweigh the costs of lost prosecutions.187 
Weighing the costs and benefits of the exclusionary rule in a particular 
context considers whether the benefit of lower Ce from following Fourth 
Amendment doctrine offsets the harm of lower P*V from evidence that 
cannot be used. Similarly, the doctrine of qualified immunity that applies to 
both civil and criminal actions against individual officers has been justified on 
grounds that it avoids overdeterrence that would cause shirking resulting 
from a threat of high Ci.188 
 
184 See id. at 1989 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the majority’s repeated emphasis that its 
holding was limited to serious offenses). 
185 Id. at 1980 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
186 See infra Section III.A. 
187 See infra notes 197–206 and accompanying text. 
188 See infra notes 232–41 and accompanying text. 
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Second, whether existing doctrine actually achieves these goals is 
frustratingly unclear. The difficulty of knowing how officers actually respond 
to various remedies creates a major barrier to more helpful analysis. With the 
empirical answers unclear,189 it is difficult to say what kinds of remedies are 
actually likely to achieve the goals set up by the narratives of existing doctrine. 
Indeed, much of the existing scholarship on economic approaches to Fourth 
Amendment law works through different assumptions about the impact of 
Fourth Amendment remedies, and particularly the exclusionary rule.190 
In general, then, existing doctrine purports to achieve economic goals but 
may or may not achieve them based on the answers to still-unresolved empirical 
questions. To see this, the section begins with a summary of Fourth Amendment 
remedies for those unfamiliar with current law, turns to the economic narratives 
of the Fourth Amendment’s remedies scheme, and then covers several critiques 
of those remedies and the assumptions on which they rest. 
A.  An Overview of Fourth Amendment Remedies 
The three primary remedies for Fourth Amendment violations apply in 
different contexts. The first is the exclusionary rule, a remedy against the state 
that limits what evidence the state can use in criminal prosecutions.191 In 
addition to the exclusionary rule, there are additional remedies that can be 
applied against individual officers who violate the Fourth Amendment. First, 
the officer can be sued for damages in his personal capacity if the search is 
unsuccessful and no charges are brought for the crime discovered.192 Second, 
an officer who violates the Fourth Amendment can be charged with a civil 
rights crime.193 
The primary and most often litigated remedy for Fourth Amendment 
violations is the exclusionary rule, the rule that evidence obtained in violation 
of the Constitution may be excluded in a subsequent criminal prosecution. 
The exclusionary rule is potentially available when a search or seizure yields 
evidence and criminal charges are brought.194 The defendant will move to 
suppress the evidence that was unlawfully obtained, and the court will rule 
on whether the Fourth Amendment was violated and (if so) if the evidence 
must be suppressed. Under the exclusionary rule, evidence that is a “fruit of 
 
189 See infra note 220 and accompanying text. 
190 See infra notes 258–268 and accompanying text. 
191 See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
192 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (allowing civil remedies for a deprivation of constitutional 
rights); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 487 n.7 (1994) (barring any civil remedies under 
§ 1983 if judgment for “the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or 
sentence”). 
193 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012). 
194 See Kerr, Fourth Amendment Remedies, supra note 84, at 240. 
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the poisonous tree” of a constitutional violation cannot be used to prove the 
defendant’s guilt.195 The jury never hears of the wrongly obtained evidence. 
If the evidence needed for guilt is suppressed, the government ordinarily will 
move to dismiss the charges and the guilty individual will go unpunished. 
Describing the scope and rationale of the exclusionary rule is difficult 
because its scope has changed considerably over time and is presently in flux. 
The Supreme Court expanded the rule dramatically in the 1960s.196 
Beginning in the 1970s and 1980s,197 however, the Court began to limit the 
rule “by weighing the costs and benefits”198 of suppression. On the cost side, 
suppression imposes societal costs by “set[ting] the criminal loose in the 
community without punishment.”199 On the benefit side, suppression can 
deter future violations of the law.200 If evidence is suppressed today and a 
criminal is set free, officers who are aiming for convictions in future cases will 
want to follow the rules to ensure that those convictions stand. As a result, 
the Court has instructed that the rule is applied only as needed to deter police 
violations of existing Fourth Amendment law.201 
How to apply this balancing test is presently the subject of considerable 
uncertainty. Before 2009, the Court applied the balancing test by considering 
broad categories of legal errors and applying the balance over that category.202 
For example, the Court would apply the balance over all knock-and-announce 
violations,203 or for all facial defects in warrants,204 to see when the 
exclusionary rule was available for that category of violation. More recently, 
however, the Court suggested that the balancing framework may apply on a 
case-by-case basis.205 As interpreted by lower courts, the new doctrine may 
ask courts to consider whether the deterrent benefit of suppression outweighs 
the loss of a conviction in that one case.206 However the Court ultimately 
 
195 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963). 
196 The most significant case was Mapp v. Ohio, which applied the exclusionary rule to state 
violations of the Fourth Amendment. 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (1961). 
197 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (applying a balancing approach to 
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198 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984). 
199 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011). 
200 Id. at 2426-27. 
201 Id. at 2426. 
202 For example, in Leon, the Court adopted general categorical rules for when errors in 
warrants should lead to suppression. 468 U.S. at 923. Reliance on minor defects does not justify 
suppression while suppression is available for reliance on major defects. Id. at 923-25. 
203 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006). 
204 See Leon, 468 U.S at 923. 
205 The Court’s decision in Davis v. United States, can be read as requiring an officer’s conduct 
to be personally culpable before the exclusionary rule is available. 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011)  
(“Police practices trigger the harsh sanction of exclusion only when they are deliberate enough to 
yield meaningful deterrence, and culpable enough to be worth the price paid by the justice system.”). 
206 See infra note 223. 
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resolves the tension, the key idea is that the scope of the exclusionary rule is 
defined by a cost/benefit consideration. 
Civil remedies against individual officers provide a secondary remedy for 
Fourth Amendment violations. Because the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
generally blocks suits against sovereigns,207 civil suits typically must be brought 
against individual officers who conduct searches and seizures. The civil remedy 
is limited in two important ways. First, civil suits can be filed only when the 
outcome would not challenge a criminal conviction.208 As a practical matter, 
this means that civil suits are mostly brought by innocent subjects of searches 
or seizures rather than convicted criminals.209 
Second, under the doctrine of qualified immunity, suits can only succeed if 
the constitutional violation was clearly established at the time it occurred.210 Civil 
damages can be recovered only if the violation was clear: the officer must be 
“plainly incompetent”211 in his effort to comply with the law rather than just 
wrong. This doctrine has been based on the need to have officers conduct searches 
and seizures free of fear of liability for minor errors while also having them keep 
an eye out for the law.212 The standard attempts to strike a balance between “the 
public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority,” which 
would be imperiled if officers could be held personally liable for all violations, 
with the need to encourage officers to be aware of and to follow “clearly 
established constitutional limits.”213 
The limitations on Fourth Amendment civil suits mean that they tend to 
play a much more limited role in enforcing the Fourth Amendment than does 
the exclusionary rule. Civil suits are also heavily focused on only a few types 
of constitutional violations. For example, a large proportion of civil Fourth 
Amendment suits alleged excessive uses of force in the investigative process, 
which can constitute an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment.214 Notably, such suits are not challenging the collection of 
evidence in the investigative process. Rather, they seek remedies for 
unreasonable harm exerted on an individual, such as shooting an unarmed 
suspect fleeing the scene of a crime. 
 
207 See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1994) (holding that 
constitutional tort suits against the federal government are barred by sovereign immunity). 
208 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 (1994). 
209 Notably, Fourth Amendment civil claims based on excessive force hold officers individually 
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of a person’s guilt. 
210 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 
211 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). 
212  See id. at 343. 
213 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978). 
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The third type of Fourth Amendment remedy is criminal prosecution 
against an officer who violated the Fourth Amendment.215 Criminal 
prosecutions for violating the Fourth Amendment are very rare,216 but the 
statutory basis of such prosecutions is long established.217 Mirroring the 
standard of qualified immunity, criminal charges cannot be brought unless 
the violation is clearly established.218 The Supreme Court has justified that 
standard on due process grounds: criminal punishment tied to uncertain 
constitutional standards does not give officers sufficient notice of what is 
criminally prohibited.219 
Identifying ex ante incentives created by Fourth Amendment remedies is 
made complicated because officers typically won’t know which remedies 
regime may apply to their conduct. If the search or seizure yields evidence 
and charges are brought, the litigated remedy for violations will be 
suppression. On the other hand, if the search or seizure yields no evidence, 
the litigated remedy (if any) would likely arise in a civil case instead. In both 
instances, criminal liability is at least a theoretical concern when the Fourth 
Amendment violation is clear. Given that the officer generally won’t know 
whether his search or seizure will lead to evidence, it is difficult to identify a 
single remedial doctrine that determines an officer’s incentives outside the 
context of blatant violations. 
B.  The Narratives of Fourth Amendment Remedies 
Whether existing remedies doctrine fulfills the economic goal of 
minimizing the costs of enforcing the law rests on presently unanswerable 
empirical questions. The empirical literature on how the exclusionary rule and 
civil damages actually deter officers is unsettled and remains in considerable 
dispute.220 This Section will instead make a narrower point. The narratives of 
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existing remedies doctrine reflect economic thinking. That is, regardless of 
whether the remedies scheme actually achieves the goals of efficient 
enforcement, the rules have been expressly justified by the goal of efficiency. 
First, the Supreme Court’s exclusionary rule jurisprudence is expressly 
economic in orientation. It requires the court to “weigh [the] costs and 
deterrence benefits”221 of suppression, suppressing evidence only if the 
deterrent benefits of suppression outweigh its costs in lost prosecutions.222 
The law generally does so using categorical rules, which weigh the net benefit 
of deterrence from making an exclusionary rule available against the net loss 
of criminal cases when the rules are violated. The idea is that deterrence 
lowers the costs of investigations by discouraging officers from steps that the 
Fourth Amendment prohibits as a result of their unacceptably high Ce. On 
the other hand, the risk of suppression lowers P, and thus lowers P*V, by 
forbidding the introduction of evidence needed to bring a successful 
prosecution. Weighing the costs and benefits of the exclusionary rule 
considers whether the benefit of lower Ce offsets the harm of lower P*V in a 
particular context.223 
For example, in United States v. Leon,224 the Court weighed the deterrent 
effect of an exclusionary rule for minor defects in warrants against the cost of 
lost cases when warrants have such minor defects. The Court concluded that 
the deterrent effect was low (because minor mistakes are the fault of the 
magistrate rather than the officer) while the cost in lost cases would be high 
(because many warrants might have minor defects), and thus that the 
exclusionary rule should not apply when search warrants have such defects.225 
Similarly, in Hudson v. Michigan,226 the Court weighed the deterrent effect of 
an exclusionary rule for violations of the requirement that officers knock and 
 
1034 (1991); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical 
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announce their presence when executing warrants.227 The majority concluded 
that officers would likely follow the rule without suppression, and that the 
cost of losing cases and allowing litigation over violations outweighed that 
cost.228 These cases reflect the notion that the social costs of exclusion are so 
great that the exclusionary rule is only justifiable when the corresponding 
deterrence benefit is quite significant. 
Unlike the exclusionary rule, the civil and criminal remedies for Fourth 
Amendment violations are imposed directly on the officer as an internal cost 
Ci.229 For an officer, a decision to take an investigative step implies a potential 
benefit derived from P*V and an additional accompanying risk of Ci imposed 
as a legal sanction if the officer has violated the law. Both criminal and civil 
remedies incorporate the limits of qualified immunity doctrine by which an 
officer cannot be held personally liable unless the violation was clear.230 The 
Court has explained this standard as “an attempt to balance competing values,” 
first in allowing a remedy “to protect the rights of citizens,” and second “to 
protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the related 
public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority.”231 
The qualified immunity standard can be seen as an effort to create 
incentives that optimize the investigative process. The Court has articulated 
a “functional approach”232 to the scope of civil liability, in which the Justices 
attempt to “examine the nature of the functions with which a particular 
official or class of officials has been lawfully entrusted, and . . . seek to evaluate 
the effect that exposure to particular forms of liability would likely have on 
the appropriate exercise of those functions.”233 Fourth Amendment law is 
complex and fact-specific, requiring police officers to make split-second 
judgments in the field234 and often generating circuit splits in the appellate 
courts.235 The Justices have adopted a qualified immunity standard out of 
concern that direct personal liability against individual officers would 
overdeter and lead to shirking.236 The cost of a single mistaken judgment in 
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a single case could be several years’ pay or (in a rare case of prosecution) an 
officer’s freedom.237 On the other hand, a rule of absolute immunity plausibly 
would underdeter violations by ensuring that officers cannot be held 
personally liable even in the case of egregious violations and ensuring that 
there would be no remedy at all when evidence was not obtained. The 
qualified immunity standard deters neither too much nor too little, at least 
according to the Court’s opinions.238 
As expressed earlier, it remains unclear whether existing Fourth 
Amendment doctrine properly serves the role that the Supreme Court 
wishes. Opinions vary widely on whether the Court’s framework rests on 
correct assumptions.239 My point here is more modest. Whether Supreme 
Court majorities correctly understand what motivates police behavior, the 
Court’s explanation of its existing remedies appears to reflect the economic 
goal of achieving the most enforcement of the law at the lowest overall cost. 
C.  Economic Critiques of the Exclusionary Rule 
Although the Fourth Amendment scholarship that draws on economic 
concepts remains relatively sparse,240 much of that literature consists of 
criticisms of the exclusionary rule.241 A quick overview of representative 
criticisms provides a sense of how the economic insights have been used and 
their strengths and weaknesses. This section will focus on three economic 
arguments against the exclusionary rule offered by Richard Posner, Hugo and 
Sue Mialon, and Tonja Jacobi, respectively. The first argument, Posner’s, has 
proved influential and has partially been adopted by existing law.242 The 
remaining two arguments show how different assumptions about how the 
exclusionary rule operates can have a major influence on perceptions of the 
rule’s value. 
 
237 See supra notes 208–220 and accompanying text. 
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1. Richard Posner on Civil Remedies 
The most prominent economic critique of the Fourth Amendment is 
Richard Posner’s 1981 argument that the then-existing form of exclusionary rule 
was an economically inefficient remedy as compared to civil tort remedies.243 
According to Posner, the exclusionary rule was “an exceptionally crude 
deterrent device.”244 When imposed, the exclusionary rule inflicted such a high 
cost that it was likely to overdeter searches and seizures at the margins.245 Given 
the uncertainties about how the Fourth Amendment should apply, Posner 
wrote, the threat of the exclusionary rule would scare officers away from close 
cases to avoid suppression of evidence.246 
In contrast, Posner argued, it should be possible to calibrate civil tort 
remedies to achieve optimal deterrence.247 A tort remedy could require officers 
to pay damages in the amount that the government action imposed unnecessary 
costs, requiring officers to pay for unreasonable externalities they impose.248 
There are common arguments against relying on tort liability to enforce the 
Fourth Amendment, such as that criminals make unsympathetic plaintiffs and 
that damages may be too small in an individual case to make a suit likely or a 
sufficient deterrent.249 According to Posner, these dynamics may be features 
rather than bugs, and in any event are not insurmountable difficulties.250 
In retrospect, Posner’s view of the exclusionary rule has largely won out 
in the intervening 35 years. Starting in 1984, three years after Posner’s essay 
appeared, the Supreme Court broadly adopted a cost–benefit approach to its 
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use that has cut back dramatically on its scope.251 Today, evidence is 
suppressed only rarely. Suppression is now treated as a “bitter pill”252 that is 
imposed “only as a last resort.”253 The exclusionary rule is applied only when 
“the deterrence benefits of suppression . . . outweigh its heavy costs,” and it 
is not imposed when the officer was acting in good faith.254 Today’s 
exclusionary rule is much narrower than the one that Posner criticized in 1981, 
and those limits largely reflect the economic concerns that Posner raised. 
Granted, only one half of Posner’s view has been adopted. Civil remedies 
today are substantially more modest than when Posner wrote. Qualified 
immunity doctrine has been applied broadly in the Fourth Amendment 
context.255 And thanks to Heck v. Humphrey,256 criminal defendants who have 
been unlawfully searched generally are prohibited from filing civil suits.257 
But at least one half of Posner’s approach, significant limitations on the 
exclusionary rule, has been largely embraced. 
2. Hugo and Sue Mialon and Incentives to Commit Crimes 
Economists Hugo Mialon and Sue Mialon have developed a formal 
economic model of the exclusionary rule, which posits that suppression 
encourages crime by increasing criminals’ incentive to commit it.258 According 
to the Mialons’ model, criminals choose whether to commit crime in part based 
on whether the exclusionary rule provides a means to avoid punishment.259 The 
expectation that evidence may be suppressed discounts the expected cost of 
committing a crime and thus encourages more of it.260 As a result, the 
exclusionary rule causes crime.261 The resulting increase in crime rates causes 
two offsetting effects on police conduct, the Mialons argue. On one hand, the 
police will search less because they will know that fewer searches will lead to 
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successful prosecutions.262 On the other hand, rising crime rates will mean 
more criminals to search and thus encourage more searches. 263 
The Mialons’ model is problematic in part because it rests on assumptions 
that seem out of step with existing doctrine and the realities of criminal 
adjudication. First, the model assumes that the Fourth Amendment is violated 
so often, and the exclusionary rule is applied so frequently, that suppression of 
critical evidence is a significant risk ex ante. Second, it assumes that criminals 
study Fourth Amendment law sufficiently closely, and are sufficiently rational 
in their risk assessment, that the likelihood of suppression can impact their 
decisions of whether to commit crime. Third, the model assumes that for a 
criminal, being arrested and prosecuted, only to have some evidence thrown 
out eventually, is akin to never being caught at all. 
These assumptions seem unrealistic in the criminal justice system we have 
today. Under the current version of the exclusionary rule, very few criminals 
go free. Even when a court rules that the Fourth Amendment was violated, a 
defendant must run a challenging gauntlet of limiting doctrines such as 
standing and the fruit-of-the-poisonous tree before suppression is available. 
By the time a court grants a motion to suppress, a defendant may have spent 
a year or more in jail pending trial. And in many cases, the government will 
be able to prove the crime without the admission of that specific evidence 
suppressed. Under those circumstances, only a very foolish criminal would be 
more likely to commit a crime based on the possibility that, after he is caught 
and charged, he will be set free thanks to the exclusionary rule. 
3. Tonja Jacobi and Juror Reactions 
Professor Jacobi has developed an economic model of the exclusionary 
rule that focuses on juror incentives, under which she concludes that the 
exclusionary rule is flawed in part because it leads to wrongful convictions.264 
According to Jacobi’s model, jurors are aware of the exclusionary rule and 
adjust their approach to verdicts accordingly. In particular, juries will react to 
gaps in the government’s case by presuming that evidence has been 
suppressed and that the government has evidence of guilt that it cannot show 
the jury.265 Jurors will then “discount the prosecution’s burden of proof—and 
the defendant’s right to reasonable doubt—by an estimate of the effect of the 
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264 Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
585, 631 (2011). For a related argument, see Richard McAdams, et al., Do Exclusionary Rules Convict 
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rule.”266 The result will be that innocent people are convicted: when the 
government has a weak case against an innocent defendant, jurors will 
imagine that evidence has been suppressed and will discount the burden of 
proof on their way to an erroneous conviction.267 
Jacobi’s model rests on empirical assumptions that are at best unproven. 
First, no study has suggested that jurors think about the exclusionary rule and 
discount burdens of proof in light of it. It is possible that some jurors may have 
that reaction, but to my knowledge no study has documented it. Second, if key 
evidence is suppressed, the case likely will not go to the jury at all: prosecutors 
ordinarily will dismiss charges based on that evidence rather than go forward 
with legally insufficient cases. Third, odd gaps in the prosecution’s case are 
much more likely to be the result of routine evidentiary rulings rather than the 
Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule. Finally, it seems worth noting that jury 
trials are the rare exception in the criminal justice system. Only about 2 to 5% 
of criminal cases result in a jury trial.268 Given these points, the dynamic that 
Jacobi’s model predicts remains unproven. 
D. Civil Remedies 
The economic perspective also prompts questions about the scope of 
Fourth Amendment civil remedies and existing assumptions about what 
motivates officer action. Under existing qualified immunity doctrine, officers 
do not internalize the costs of their Fourth Amendment violations—much 
less the cost of their investigative steps—because they are held liable only 
where the violation is obvious and the officer is “plainly incompetent.”269 The 
case for qualified immunity has been based significantly on fears that personal 
liability can overdeter and lead to shirking.270 The Justices have largely 
assumed that an officer sued in his personal capacity will pay a judgment out 
of his own pocket. 
A recent article by Joanna Schwartz casts doubt on this assumption,271 and 
raises the significant argument that eliminating qualified immunity could 
help internalize investigative costs without inducing shirking. Schwartz 
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gathered data on litigation payouts and indemnification decisions for         
forty-four large police departments and thirty-seven small and mid-sized 
departments, collectively representing about 20% of police officers in the 
United States.272 The results were surprising. From 2006 to 2011, officers in 
the large departments personally contributed to only 0.41 % of the almost 
10,000 judgments against individual officers, amounting to only 0.02% of the 
$735 million in judgments against them.273 Officers in the smaller and          
mid-size departments contributed nothing at all, and no officer in any 
jurisdiction contributed to punitive damages payments.274 
Schwartz’s findings have an obvious implication for the scope of civil 
liability. If individual officers do not pay judgments against them, then the 
fear of overdeterrence that has justified qualified immunity doctrine is subject 
to serious question.275 The structure of modern civil liability doctrine may be 
premised on an incorrect assumption of officer incentives. As with the 
exclusionary rule, existing law on civil remedies can be (and has been) 
explained using the economic approach. And as with the exclusionary rule, 
whether existing law is premised on accurate assumptions about officer 
incentives remains uncertain. 
IV. USEFULNESS OF THE ECONOMIC UNDERSTANDING OF SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE LAW 
A skeptical reader might respond, “Well, so what?” Perhaps the economic 
approach is merely a “just so” story that can be asserted for any area of law. 
Given that there are many theories of the Fourth Amendment, and economic 
approaches are unlikely to displace them, exactly what is gained by conceiving 
of search and seizure law through an economic lens? 
This Part argues that the approach has three related benefits. First, the 
approach can explain the possible functional role of existing doctrine, bringing 
to light functions that can be otherwise difficult to see. Second, the approach 
can provide a common language for analyzing the basic choices and 
implications of different rules. Third, and most importantly, the approach 
provides a normative lens for analyzing proposals to reform the law. 
Most of this Part focuses on the normative implications by revisiting a 
recurring debate in Fourth Amendment law on crime-severity distinctions. 
Most Fourth Amendment rules are “transsubstantive,” to use Bill Stuntz’s 
term: they apply in the same way for all crimes that are defined by the 
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legislature.276 Among Fourth Amendment scholars, the relative absence of 
crime-severity distinctions has been widely criticized.277 Scholars have argued 
that the public interest side of Fourth Amendment reasonableness should 
focus more on the crime under investigation, with investigations of less 
serious crimes triggering greater restrictions.278 The Supreme Court has 
resisted this argument, however, chiefly on the ground of administrability.279 
This Part shows how the economic model can shed new light on the   
crime-severity debate. The economic model can explain the specific 
conditions under which crime-severity distinctions are more or less likely to 
serve the interests of a more efficient investigative process. It shows that, in 
general, such distinctions are more likely to be desirable when considering 
techniques with moderate externalities, techniques used to investigate both 
major and minor crimes, and techniques applied in narrow factual settings. 
Applying these general principles to existing doctrine suggests that          
crime-severity distinctions would work more effectively in some settings, 
such as the regulation of stop-and-frisk, but less effectively elsewhere. 
A. The Descriptive Benefit 
The first benefit of the economic approach is what I will call a descriptive 
benefit: it offers a functional explanation of existing doctrines that may 
otherwise be difficult to see. The existence of a functional explanation does 
not mean that existing doctrine succeeds in serving that function. But it 
might, and that can help explain existing doctrines in a way that can be a 
significant advance over the status quo. Search and seizure law is often 
described as a theoretical disaster. As Louis Michael Seidman and Silas 
Wasserstrom memorably put it, the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence consists of “a series of inconsistent and bizarre results that [the 
Court] has left entirely undefended.”280 Understanding how existing doctrine 
might further the functional role suggested by the economic approach can 
help shed light on existing law and require attention from those who propose 
that existing law should be changed.   
Consider the massive amount of legal scholarship arguing that the Court 
should adopt a broader view of what constitutes a Fourth Amendment “search.” 
Some argue that the linguistic meaning of the word “search” demands a broader 
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interpretation.281 Many scholars argue that the Supreme Court misunderstands 
when an expectation of privacy is reasonable, which leads the Court to misapply 
the search doctrine.282 The common view is that most investigative techniques 
should be deemed a search.283 Lurking in these works is an underexplored 
question: why have investigative practices that are categorically exempt from 
Fourth Amendment regulation as nonsearches? To many scholars, the category 
of nonsearch is a constitutional oddity.284 
The economic model suggests a functional explanation for the carve-out. 
Criminal procedure law is only needed for investigative steps with high 
externalities relative to internal costs. When externalities are low, the internal 
costs of police action accurately reflect the overall social costs. The risk of the 
police engaging in low-benefit but high-cost investigative steps is small. The 
need for search and seizure law arises only when externalities are high, 
creating a gap between social welfare and government incentives. The      
carve-out of nonsearches limits legal regulation to the problems that the law 
exists to address and provides a destination for the channeling function of the 
law away from high-cost investigative techniques. Imposing legal regulation 
when externalities are low likely would block welfare-enhancing investigative 
steps instead of inefficient ones. 
B.  The Analytical Benefit 
The second benefit of the economic approach is what I will call the 
analytical benefit: the language and concepts of economics can help clarify 
and explain arguments about search and seizure law that may otherwise be 
murky. Many key concepts in the field are deeply contested, such as the 
 
281 See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 
396 (1974) (“The plain meaning of the English language would surely not be affronted if every police 
activity that involves seeking out crime or evidence of crime were held to be a search.”). 
282 As an example, dozens if not hundreds of articles have made this criticism with respect to 
third party doctrine. See, e.g., Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the “Legitimate 
Expectation of Privacy,” 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1315-16 (1981) (“The selective disclosure cases are a 
prime example of the Supreme Court’s use of the privacy concept, which originally was designed to 
expand the scope of fourth amendment protection, to draw unrealistic distinctions in favor of law 
enforcement.”); Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65 IND. 
L.J. 549, 564-66 (1990) (“The Supreme Court has used the ‘knowing exposure’ rationale to 
transform the reasonable expectation of privacy standard into a simple assumption of risk test.”). 
283 See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1514 (2010) 
(arguing that the Fourth Amendment should apply “whenever a problem of reasonable significance 
can be identified with a particular form of government information gathering”). 
284 See, e.g., John F. Stinneford, The “Not a Search” Game, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 19-20 
(2015) (describing the Supreme Court’s cases holding various surveillance practices to be nonsearches 
as a “game” that the Justices play to wrongly label reasonable searches as nonsearches). 
2016] An Economic Understanding of Search and Seizure Law 639 
nature of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test.285 When basic concepts 
are contested, progress can be difficult. Scholars and courts alike could use 
the shared language and clearer concepts of economics to improve the clarity 
of their arguments. 
Consider, for example, the central concept of Fourth Amendment 
balancing. Fourth Amendment doctrine often features balancing, and yet courts 
and scholars are often unsure of what exactly to balance.286 The doctrine often 
calls for comparing apples and oranges. How do you “balance” the 
government’s interest in a case against an individual’s interest in privacy?   
The economic approach suggests a few answers. First, when a court 
“balances” the intrusion of a search with the degree it promotes legitimate 
government interests, the proper question is whether the marginal benefits of 
that promotion were reasonably expected to exceed its marginal costs.287 In 
some instances, that balancing will occur on a case-by-case basis (such as 
whether an officer’s use of force was excessive).288 In other contexts, the 
balancing is more categorical (such as how much cause is required to stop a 
suspect).289 In either case, the purpose of the balancing is to identify the 
factual category of acts—and legal regulation of that category, if any—in 
which the benefits to promoting the enforcement of the law P*V will be 
expected to exceed the costs of that act Ci + Ce. 
Even just the simple lesson of marginal thinking could help courts. In 
conducting Fourth Amendment balancing, courts often compare absolute costs 
to marginal benefits or marginal costs to absolute benefits with predictable 
results. A Second Circuit decision on the reasonableness of national security 
wiretapping abroad provides an example.290 In balancing the privacy costs of 
surveillance with its security benefits, the Second Circuit compared marginal 
costs to absolute benefits.291 The court considered whether invading the target’s 
privacy was justified in light of the general public interest in catching terrorists, 
instead of weighing how much the government’s monitoring advanced the public 
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interest in stopping terrorist attacks.292 Unsurprisingly, the court found that the 
benefit of the monitoring outweighed the costs and that the monitoring was 
reasonable.293 We can’t know if the court would have reached a different result 
had it compared marginal costs to marginal benefits. But this was the right 
question to ask, and answering it would have required a very different analysis. 
A similar problem arises when courts weigh the costs and benefits of the 
exclusionary rule. Courts should compare marginal costs to marginal benefits. 
Instead, decisions often weigh the marginal benefit of suppression with the 
absolute costs of the exclusionary rule.294 Existing doctrine generally assumes 
as a matter of law that the exclusionary rule always has “heavy costs,”295 
foregoing focus on marginal costs for an abstract consideration of costs in the 
absolute.296 The result stacks the deck against the exclusionary rule. An 
explicit recognition of the economic approach might lead courts to make the 
proper comparison between marginal costs and marginal benefits more often. 
C. The Normative Benefit 
The third benefit of the economic approach is normative. The approach 
helps generate nonobvious insights about the merits of different aspects of 
search and seizure law. The remainder of the Article demonstrates the point 
by focusing on a salient example, the debate over crime-severity distinctions 
in Fourth Amendment law. It begins by introducing the crime-severity 
debate; it then turns to the insights of the economic approach; and it 
concludes by showing how the insights can shed light on when crime-severity 
distinctions are more or less likely to be helpful. 
1. Introduction to the Crime-Severity Debate 
Fourth Amendment law features categorical rules that usually apply to all 
investigations without reference to the severity of the crime investigated. As 
Jeffrey Bellin has summarized, “[T]he legal standard for evaluating a search (or 
seizure) is the same whether a police officer suspects that a person jaywalked or 
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is the Green River Killer.”297 The Supreme Court has generally rejected efforts 
to create different categorical rules that apply to different offenses based on the 
seriousness of the crime.298 To be clear, not all Fourth Amendment doctrine 
ignores the seriousness of the offense. Crime-severity distinctions are used on 
occasion.299 But they remain the exception rather than the rule. 
The rarity of crime-severity distinctions in Fourth Amendment law has 
drawn widespread criticism from many prominent Fourth Amendment 
scholars. Bill Stuntz,300 Akhil Amar, 301 John Kaplan, 302 Sherry Colb, 303 and 
Jeffrey Bellin304 have all argued for crime-specific Fourth Amendment rules. 
Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment rules are not well tailored to the 
government interest, they reason. To enable the government sufficient power 
to investigate major crimes, such blunt rules end up granting the government 
too much power to investigate minor offenses in ways that lead to abuses—
and in some circumstances give the government too little power to investigate 
particularly serious offenses such as terrorist plots. 
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The Supreme Court’s rejection of these arguments has focused on 
administrative costs. In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,305 the plaintiff argued 
that being arrested for a very minor offense—driving without a seatbelt, 
which had a maximum penalty of a $50 fine—was not “reasonable” even with 
probable cause.306 The five-Justice majority rejected Atwater’s  crime-severity 
distinction on the ground that administering the Fourth Amendment 
generally called for bright-line rules rather than case-by-case judgments.307 
Incorporating a crime-severity distinction into a bright-line rule was 
unworkable because officers in the field would be unable to apply it: the     
fact-specific nature of criminal codes and the uncertain facts of quickly 
evolving investigations left officers unable to know whether a particular 
offense was sufficiently serious to satisfy otherwise plausible crime-severity 
lines.308 The difficulty of knowing how the law should apply would lead to 
costly litigation and likely overdeter officers from taking the risk of making 
an arrest.309 In context, “the costs to society” of letting people go when they 
should have been arrested “could easily outweigh the costs to defendants of 
being needlessly arrested and booked.”310 
Although Atwater raises a serious concern about administrative costs, 
those costs must be weighed against the potential gains of crime-severity 
distinctions. The important question is a contextual one: what are the 
circumstances in which the benefits of crime-severity are likely to be 
significant, such that they may outweigh the costs identified by the Court in 
Atwater? As the next subsection shows, the economic model of the Fourth 
Amendment articulated in this article can help identify those circumstances. 
2. Insights of the Economic Model 
The argument for crime-severity distinctions is readily understood in 
economic terms. Because V is smaller for a minor crime than for a major 
crime, and Ci is constant, a particular technique should be used for less serious 
crimes when P is particularly high or Ce particularly low. But matters become 
more complicated because search and seizure law ordinarily relies on 
categorical rules, or at least standards within broad categories. Recall from 
Part I that in choosing between two legal rules, a permissive rule p and a 
restrictive rule r, a court could compare the sum of P*V – Ci – Ce over the 
steps Nr (under the restrictive rule) to that sum over steps Np (under the 
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permissive rule). If the step triggers high externalities and would be used 
often under the permissive rule, for example, the sum of the steps over Nr 
would likely be greater than the sum of the steps over Np and the restrictive 
rule would be preferable to the permissive rule. 
The option of a crime-severity distinction adds a third option. The 
restrictive rule and permissive rule operate at the same time, but for different 
crimes. For example, the law might adopt the permissive rule for 
investigations of serious crimes but the restrictive rule for investigations of 
minor crimes. Now we introduce a third comparison, the sum of                      
P*V – Ci – Ce over the subset of steps Nr that involve minor crimes in addition 
to the subset of steps Np that involve serious crimes. The comparison allows 
us to develop a qualitative sense of the contexts in which a crime-severity 
distinction could be desirable and when it is less so. In particular, it suggests 
three lessons about when crime-severity distinctions might be more or less 
likely to be beneficial. 
First, the case for a crime-severity distinction is strongest when a 
particular investigative step has moderate externalities. If the investigative 
step imposes high external costs, it would be preferable to impose the 
restrictive rule for all crimes. On the other hand, if it triggers only low 
external costs, it would be preferable to have a permissive rule for all crimes. 
The sweet spot of moderate externalities appears to create the best context 
for crime-severity distinctions. Under those assumptions, allowing the 
practice for serious crimes under a permissive rule would more likely enhance 
welfare but allowing the same practice under the permissive rule for minor 
crimes more likely would not. 
Second, the case for crime-severity distinctions is strongest when the 
particular investigative technique would be used frequently for both major 
crimes and minor crimes under the permissive rule. Frequent use for both 
major crimes and minor crimes is most likely to justify taking on the difficult 
problem of administrative costs explored in Atwater. If an investigative 
technique is used mostly for major crimes under a permissive rule, then few 
instances of medium-cost, low-benefit uses will occur for minor crimes that 
would justify the administrative costs of a crime-severity distinction to justify 
imposing the restrictive rule for minor crimes.311 On the other hand, if an 
investigative technique is rarely used for major crimes under a permissive rule, 
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then few medium-cost, high-benefit uses will occur for major crimes that might 
justify the administrative costs of a special permissive rule for major crimes. 
A third limitation is that crime-severity distinctions are more likely to be 
useful when the doctrine concerns a narrow rule or even case-by-case standard 
rather than a rule of wide applicability. This is so because the comparison 
required to decide whether to adopt a crime-severity distinction—specifically, 
comparing the sum of P*V – Ci – Ce over the full set Nr, the full set Np, and 
the subset of steps Nr that involves minor crimes in addition to the subset of 
steps Np that involves serious crimes—requires considerable knowledge about 
those sets of uses. The wider the rule, the less likely it is that courts can gauge 
the set of uses under a restrictive and permissive rule to determine the 
desirability of crime-severity distinctions. On the other hand, the narrower 
the uses contemplated by the rule, the more likely it is that these values can 
be plausibly estimated. At the extreme end, if the doctrine calls for a            
case-by-case determination in the one case under review rather than a 
categorical rule, the case for factoring in crime-severity is easiest to make. 
3. Better and Worse Contexts for Crime-Severity Distinctions 
These general principles support more specific conclusions about when 
crime-severity distinctions are more or less promising. For example, the 
threshold question of what counts as a search or seizure provides a difficult 
context for crime-severity distinctions. When courts consider whether a 
technique constitutes a search or seizure, the question is typically generalized. 
The issue is whether that kind of technique is regulated by the Fourth 
Amendment regardless of the context in which it is used. A broad rule 
complicates the possible use of crime-severity distinctions because the set of 
uses of the technique are difficult to predict. On the other hand, if the rule is 
so narrow that it applies only to a particular kind of investigation, it is less likely 
that applications of the rule will occur with both major and minor crimes. 
The facts and scope of Kyllo v. United States312 provide a helpful 
illustration. In Kyllo, the FBI used an infrared thermal imaging device 
directed at a home to determine the temperature of exterior walls and develop 
cause to believe that a marijuana growing enterprise was occurring inside.313 
In crafting a rule to determine whether the facts of Kyllo constituted a search, 
the Court had to choose between ruling broadly or narrowly. The Court opted 
to “tak[e] the long view,” and adopted a single rule for all sense-enhancing 
devices directed at a home, whether for existing infrared devices or future 
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technologies that may be able to see through walls.314 With a rule so broad, it 
is difficult to know what technology will be regulated in the future or what 
uses it will find. The Court was handing down doctrine to regulate 
technologies not yet invented. It is therefore difficult to know the sets Np, Nr, 
or their subsets for minor and major crimes. This is not a promising context 
for a crime-severity distinction. 
The Kyllo court could have adopted a narrower approach, however, such 
as crafting a rule that only applies to the use of infrared thermal imaging 
devices directed at a home. But the only likely use of such technologies in 
criminal investigations was precisely the use in that case: taking thermal 
images to find wide-scale use of growing lamps in marijuana growing 
investigations. The absence of a diverse context for using such a narrow 
technology would also counsel against a crime-severity distinction. 
Reasonable people can disagree about whether thermal imaging should 
constitute a search. But there’s little benefit to a crime-severity distinction 
for a technology only used in one specific kind of criminal investigation. 
In contrast, Fourth Amendment doctrines that rely on case-by-case standards 
are a more promising context for crime severity distinctions. The obvious 
example is exigent circumstances, which allows warrantless searches and seizures 
when an emergency requires quick action because delay would frustrate the 
search for evidence.315 Because every exigency case is different, and each requires 
an individual weighing of government and privacy interests in that one case, it is 
simple to consider the severity of the crime under investigation. And indeed, this 
is one of the rare contexts in which the Court has recognized crime-severity as 
relevant. In Welsh v. Wisconsin,316 the Court held that “an important factor to be 
considered when determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the 
underlying offense for which the arrest is being made.”317 The Court presented 
this as a “common-sense”318 idea in light of the need to weigh the government’s 
interest against the privacy interest; surely the government had a lesser interest 
in investigating a less serious crime.319 
The law of stop-and-frisk under the framework created by Terry v. Ohio320 
also offers a relatively promising context for crime-severity distinctions, 
albeit one less straightforward than the case-by-case weighing of exigent 
circumstances. Stops and frisks tend to involve mid-level externalities. 
Stopping a person is an inconvenience, but less of an inconvenience than a 
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646 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 164: 591 
full arrest. Frisking is an affront, but such searches must be narrow searches 
for officer safety reasons and are less invasive than a complete search for 
evidence. Second, stops and frisks occur frequently both for major crimes and 
minor crimes. Officers routinely stop individuals for minor offenses such as 
traffic violations or trespasses. On the other hand, they also frequently use 
stop-and-frisk to investigate major crimes such as homicides. Third, the rules 
for stop-and-frisk regulate narrow and specific sets of facts, allowing courts 
to craft severity distinctions with a relatively strong understanding of the 
distribution of uses. 
These elements make the law of stop-and-frisk relatively favorable to the 
introduction of crime-severity distinctions. For example, courts could use 
crime-severity distinctions to regulate how long stops may occur. They could 
hold that reasonable suspicion to believe a suspect has committed a minor 
offense justifies only a very short stop, while reasonable suspicion to believe 
a suspect has committed a serious offense justifies a significantly longer one. 
Similarly, they could use such distinctions to regulate whether and when the 
police can ask questions unrelated to the stop. Stops for minor offenses could 
have more limited questioning, while stops for major offenses could allow 
broader questioning. Finally, the courts could expressly adopt a view, 
suggested but not reached in United States v. Hensley,321 that stops to 
investigate past crimes are permitted for major crimes but not for minor ones. 
Each of these proposals raises the competing problem of administrative costs 
raised in Atwater, and the choice of whether or how to draw the distinction 
would need to be analyzed on its merits.322 But the economic approach is 
helpful to cabin the analysis by identifying the kinds of contexts in which a 
crime-severity distinction is more or less promising. 
CONCLUSION 
Resistance to economic thinking in search and seizure law may reflect 
decades-old perceptions among criminal procedure professors that law and 
 
321 See 469 U.S. 221, 223-24, 229 (1985) (allowing stop of a suspect for a past crime, “in the context 
of felonies or crimes involving a threat to public safety,” but also stating that “[w]e need not and do not 
decide today whether Terry stops to investigate all past crimes, however serious, are permitted”). 
322 Cf. Orin S. Kerr, A First Look at Navarette v. California: Are Stops Governed by the Rules of 
Terry or by Case-by-Case Reasonableness?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 2, 2014), http://volokh.com/ 
2014/01/02/first-look-navarette-v-california-stops-governed-rules-terry-case-case-reasonableness/ 
[http://perma.cc/4Z8V-9ZX2] (arguing that a case-by-case balancing approach would be hard to 
apply in a suppression hearing, enables courts to manipulate the standard to reach the desired 
outcome, and would make the constitutionality of a search dependent on variable public perceptions 
of crime severity). 
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economics is a tool chiefly used to narrow constitutional rights.323 To academics 
with expansive views of the Bill of Rights, the notion of importing economics 
into discussions of search and seizure law may resemble a large wooden horse 
left by the Greek army just outside the city of Troy. However appealing it may 
seem in the abstract, one wouldn’t want to wheel it inside the gates. 
If that history continues to influence perceptions among criminal procedure 
scholars today, the association is both unfortunate and inaccurate. The 
economic view of search and seizure law respects and encompasses the full 
range of civil libertarian positions about the proper scope of constitutional and 
statutory privacy rights. It merely seeks to situate those claims in a framework 
that can clarify and explain the functional role of different possible rules subject 
to different assumptions about what motivates the police. The economic 
understanding is not a magic wand that solves problems. But it provides a 
useful framework—descriptively, analytically, and normatively—that deserves 
more attention among criminal procedure scholars. 
 
 
323 See John J. Donohue III, Law and Economics: The Road Not Taken, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
903, 904 (1988) (“[F]or many, law and economics implies Posner, Bork, and Easterbrook, and it 
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(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the cost–benefit analysis in the exclusionary rule context 
provides “an illusion of technical precision and ineluctability” that disguises an agenda to make the 
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